godkiller
"We are the Fury"
http://www.sharpfootballanalysis.co...and-intentionally-worse-after-inking-new-deal
Read and weep, brehs. Jay Cutler is
. Start Jimmy Clausen:
Advanced Metrics Show a “Renagade” Jay Cutler’s Decision Making was Measurably (and Intentionally?) Worse After Inking New Deal
Posted on March 3, 2015
By Warren Sharp
It’s long been told that Jay Cutler has problems. But recently it was reported by Rotoworldthat Cutler intentionally sabotaged Trestman’s offense, becoming a “rogue” passer and a “renegade”. The full post stated:
“At least ten” former members of the Lovie Smith and Marc Trestman coaching staffs told ESPN Chicago the Bears “can’t consistently compete for championships” with Jay Cutler as the quarterback.
Two Bears teammates also said they consider Cutler “a divisive figure with whom they’d rather not continue to play.” Beat writer Michael C. Wright still expects the Bears to give Cutler “one last shot,” something his contract almost requires they do. It’s no secret Cutler essentially sabotaged Trestman’s offense, refusing to operate within the confines of the system. When asked about his willingness to adhere to any offensive structure, several ex-Bears coaches used the terms “renegade” and “rogue” to describe Cutler’s play.
Its one thing for a player to struggle with an offense. To not be a right fit, and have issues living up to expectations. But its a totally different matter when a quarterback refused to play like the coach wanted, and became a total renegade to the point that multiple teammates and former coaches bring it up in discussion.
Keep in mind, all of this plays into the fact that in January of 2014 (immediately after the 2013 season ended and prior to the 2014 season starting) Cutler signed a 7 year, $126.7M contract with $54M guaranteed. This was, and will always be, far beyond what any coach is paid. Did that give Cutler the confidence to think he can operate however he would like? Even to the point that he would play completely opposite of what a coach wanted, accepting whatever consequences arise (given his $54M guaranteed contract), including but not limited to getting that coach fired?
Due to that new contract between the 2013 and 2014 seasons, it made for a very clear line in the sand from which to measure Cutler’s performance. His head coach, Marc Trestman, came the Bears in 2013. Cutler put up solid numbers. That led to the Bears deciding after the 2013 season to make Cutler the face of the franchise for years to come. Having been paid, Cutler apparently used 2014 to turn on Trestman’s offense.
Can we find any proof of this? Without wire taps, “proof” is hard to come by, but we can look at the numbers, the advanced metrics, and see what changed from 2013 to 2014. So I looked at the advanced metrics for quarterbacks over at Pro Football Focus, and some of these results were fairly remarkable. Particularly when comparing Cutler’s variance between 2013 and 2014 with all other starting QBs in the NFL. In many cases, no other QB’s stats were even close to the drop off that Cutler put on film in 2014.
Time in the Pocket
When Under Pressure
Deep Passing
Air Yardage
What was Cutler Doing?
Nothing here is outright proof that Cutler sabotaged his coach, but what it is proof of is that Cutler’s performance changed in 2014, and changed for the worse. Which is not what you would expect in the 2nd year of an offense.
Read and weep, brehs. Jay Cutler is
. Start Jimmy Clausen: Advanced Metrics Show a “Renagade” Jay Cutler’s Decision Making was Measurably (and Intentionally?) Worse After Inking New Deal
Posted on March 3, 2015
By Warren Sharp
It’s long been told that Jay Cutler has problems. But recently it was reported by Rotoworldthat Cutler intentionally sabotaged Trestman’s offense, becoming a “rogue” passer and a “renegade”. The full post stated:
“At least ten” former members of the Lovie Smith and Marc Trestman coaching staffs told ESPN Chicago the Bears “can’t consistently compete for championships” with Jay Cutler as the quarterback.
Two Bears teammates also said they consider Cutler “a divisive figure with whom they’d rather not continue to play.” Beat writer Michael C. Wright still expects the Bears to give Cutler “one last shot,” something his contract almost requires they do. It’s no secret Cutler essentially sabotaged Trestman’s offense, refusing to operate within the confines of the system. When asked about his willingness to adhere to any offensive structure, several ex-Bears coaches used the terms “renegade” and “rogue” to describe Cutler’s play.
Its one thing for a player to struggle with an offense. To not be a right fit, and have issues living up to expectations. But its a totally different matter when a quarterback refused to play like the coach wanted, and became a total renegade to the point that multiple teammates and former coaches bring it up in discussion.
Keep in mind, all of this plays into the fact that in January of 2014 (immediately after the 2013 season ended and prior to the 2014 season starting) Cutler signed a 7 year, $126.7M contract with $54M guaranteed. This was, and will always be, far beyond what any coach is paid. Did that give Cutler the confidence to think he can operate however he would like? Even to the point that he would play completely opposite of what a coach wanted, accepting whatever consequences arise (given his $54M guaranteed contract), including but not limited to getting that coach fired?
Due to that new contract between the 2013 and 2014 seasons, it made for a very clear line in the sand from which to measure Cutler’s performance. His head coach, Marc Trestman, came the Bears in 2013. Cutler put up solid numbers. That led to the Bears deciding after the 2013 season to make Cutler the face of the franchise for years to come. Having been paid, Cutler apparently used 2014 to turn on Trestman’s offense.
Can we find any proof of this? Without wire taps, “proof” is hard to come by, but we can look at the numbers, the advanced metrics, and see what changed from 2013 to 2014. So I looked at the advanced metrics for quarterbacks over at Pro Football Focus, and some of these results were fairly remarkable. Particularly when comparing Cutler’s variance between 2013 and 2014 with all other starting QBs in the NFL. In many cases, no other QB’s stats were even close to the drop off that Cutler put on film in 2014.
Time in the Pocket
- In 2013, when holding the ball for 2.5 or fewer seconds (which means a decisive progression and early throw based on an understanding of pre-snap coverage), Cutler was not sacked at all.
- In 2014, when holding the ball for 2.5 or fewer seconds, Cutler was sacked 10 times.
- No starting QB saw that type of increase last year. The closest ones were two gimpy, injured players who are very accustomed to scrambling (Robert Griffin III and Cam Newton), but both only saw increases of 7 sacks, a far cry from the 10 of Cutler.
When Under Pressure
- In 2013, Cutler was pressured on 39% of his dropbacks. That was one of the highest figures in the NFL. He was sacked on 12.6% of those dropbacks.
- In 2014, the strategy was to keep Cutler cleaner. And it worked from a pressure perspective – he was pressured on only 30.1% of his dropbacks, well below the NFL average. But Cutler was sacked on 20% of the times he was pressured, which was a significant increase.
- The 8.1% reduction in pressure percentage was one of the greatest things Trestman could do for Cutler. In fact, the only QB who saw pressure less often from 2013 to 2014 was Eli Manning, who received a brand new coordinator in 2014 with the intent (like Trestman) of getting the ball out faster to keep Eli healthier.
- This change appears to indicate that while Trestman was “doing his job” in keeping Cutler cleaner in the pocket and designing protections to reduce the pressure on Cutler, Cutler was not living up to what he needed to do in terms of getting the ball out and reducing sacks.
Deep Passing- In 2013, Cutler threw the ball deep (20+ yards downfield) on 16.1% of his attempts. He connected on a solid 45.6% of those passes. Combined, it was one of the best deep passing years from any QB (only Nick Foles was better with similar attempts).
- In 2014, Cutler threw the ball deep on only 10.6% of his attempts, and despite being more cautious with less frequent deep shots, his accuracy was a miserable 32.8%.
- The 12.8% reduction in accuracy was 2nd worst of any QB from 2013 to 2014, only Geno Smith was worse.
- The decision to throw deep 5.2% less often, however, was not seen by any other QB. On average, QBs threw the ball deep MORE often in 2014 than in 2013, but Cutler threw it deep less often.
- His yds/attempt on deep passes decreased from 14.5 ypa in 2013 to 10.6 in 2014. That 3.9 ypa decrease was the 2nd worst in the NFL last year.
Air Yardage- In 2013, 65.4% of Cutler’s yardage came in the air, before the receiver caught the football. This was the 2nd best mark in the NFL, and was well above average. In other words, only 34.6% of his yardage was “YAC” accumulated by his receivers after the catch.
- In 2014, only 46.5% of Cutler’s yardage came in the air. Most of his yardage was gained by the receiver doing the hard work of running after the catch.
- The variance of 18.9% was WELL above the NFL average. Only Robert Griffin III had his receivers do more from 2013 to 2014. The next closest QB saw a 10.9% variance compared to Cutler’s 18.9% change.
What was Cutler Doing?
Nothing here is outright proof that Cutler sabotaged his coach, but what it is proof of is that Cutler’s performance changed in 2014, and changed for the worse. Which is not what you would expect in the 2nd year of an offense.
- In the same offense, you would expect quicker, better decision making in the pocket, not moving from 0 sacks to 10 sacks when holding the ball for 2.5 or fewer seconds.
- In the same offense, you would expect when getting pressured less often, to see a similar or lower sack rate as well, not an increase from 13% to 20%.
- In the same offense, you would expect similar deep passing numbers, but if there is a drop in the frequency, it should come with similar or better accuracy, not a drop in accuracy from 46% to 33%.
- In the same offense, you would expect a similar rate of “air yardage” to come from the passing game, not a decrease from 65% yds before the catch down to 47%.
