ogc163
Superstar
When we think of social upheaval and even revolution, the three catalysts that often come to mind are food insecurity (especially over bread), mass unemployment, and war. We can also include high debts and income inequality in the mix, among others. In recent years, another possible factor has entered the conversation: elite overproduction or the problem of too many prospective elites. It is a term popularized by Peter Turchin, a macro-historian and mathematician who specializes in modeling historical trends.
Turchin has garnered both intrigue and notoriety for pursuing what can best be described as Hari Seldon’s dream. In Isaac Asimov’s sci-fi Foundation series, Hari Seldon is the brain behind a field called psychohistory: a methodology that seeks to predict the future through complex, statistical aggregates of the past. Much like Seldon, Turchin’s work argues that history does have hard-wired probabilities that can be precisely measured. He does so by utilizing the heaps of data we have at our disposal nowadays, relying on dozens of socio-economic indicators said to weaken social cohesion, thus creating cycles of unrest. Elite overproduction is one such indicator and likely the most unique of the bunch.
Turchin’s scope has always been exceptionally large, analyzing the long durée of history’s processes to pinpoint patterns. He has even developed his own interdisciplinary field called cliometrics—a branch of historical dynamics, the scientific modeling of history’s movement. For Turchin, history could be a hard science, and historians could serve as clairvoyants who can glimpse into the future. He has seen a surge of interest lately for predicting in 2012 that the 2020s would be a decade of “major upheaval.”
In this piece, I’ll be tackling both the merits of the theory itself and the limitations of Turchin’s scientific history by discussing a period when elite overproduction was at an acute, practically terminal, stage. The period in question is Russia in the latter half of the 19th century. Artists and writers at the time often spoke of a resentful, educated group that was pushing the country in an unknown direction. Ideologically potent, what became of this faction and their followers ultimately turned out to be of immense consequence to world history.
An investigation into how elite overproduction unraveled Russia could also provide us with some perspective on how to assess the process in our own, present time. But more on all that shortly, because it would first be a good idea to properly define the term as Turchin understands it.
As someone who has often privileged looking at social history ‘from below,’ it is sometimes helpful to instead consider things from the vantage point of the very top. In democracies, rivalries within power itself often get misleadingly interpreted as possessing some popular character because that is the way we colloquially speak of its governance. However, given that U.S. electoral party politics has become less willing and able to integrate popular demands for decades now, perhaps an explanation ‘from above’ can be more explanatory.1
Turchin’s story of elite overproduction in the United States begins in the 1970s when workers’ wages first stopped keeping pace with productivity. You may have seen this chart before.
The resulting income inequality created not only an unprecedented gap, but the sheer number of wealthy people also increased.
Naturally, as the pool of potential elite members grows, so does enrollment within higher education. But because the various centers of social power cannot absorb this larger and larger caste of people, a degree no longer necessarily grants you the status it once did. Many college graduates, even from leading universities, find themselves today chronically underemployed, indebted and despondent. This is essentially elite overproduction: an excess of overly-credentialed people and not enough positions. It causes all areas of social power to become bloated and ill-responsive, effectively working more and more as if solely for-themselves and their own longevity because they must now be hyper-competitive and guarded.
Turchin is not the first to invent this theory, but he has given it a proper name. Some of the earlier assessments of American elite power include C. Wright Mills’s The Power Elite (1956) and others. Yet, it is historian Arnold J. Toynbee’s twelve-volume A Study of History (1934-1961) that most resembles Turchin’s work, at least in spirit. He put forward a cyclical civilizational theory where creative (elite) minorities devolve into dominant (elite) minorities that worship themselves, leading to decay.4 The ruling elites insulate themselves, and become slower and less attuned to the demands of the actually-existing society under them. At the same time, Turchin would argue, more people than ever want to join their ranks. What results is institutional sclerosis and inertia, weakened state capacity, the decoupling of the state from the base of society, and many other symptoms of malaise.
Naturally, there’s many directions you can take this theory. Maybe one could even say its consequences are greatly overstated, but Turchin could not disagree more. He argues elite overproduction is a transhistorical problem not rooted in any particular period. Among his indicators, he considers it “one of the more important factors” in predicting instability across all of history.5
Turchin has garnered both intrigue and notoriety for pursuing what can best be described as Hari Seldon’s dream. In Isaac Asimov’s sci-fi Foundation series, Hari Seldon is the brain behind a field called psychohistory: a methodology that seeks to predict the future through complex, statistical aggregates of the past. Much like Seldon, Turchin’s work argues that history does have hard-wired probabilities that can be precisely measured. He does so by utilizing the heaps of data we have at our disposal nowadays, relying on dozens of socio-economic indicators said to weaken social cohesion, thus creating cycles of unrest. Elite overproduction is one such indicator and likely the most unique of the bunch.
Turchin’s scope has always been exceptionally large, analyzing the long durée of history’s processes to pinpoint patterns. He has even developed his own interdisciplinary field called cliometrics—a branch of historical dynamics, the scientific modeling of history’s movement. For Turchin, history could be a hard science, and historians could serve as clairvoyants who can glimpse into the future. He has seen a surge of interest lately for predicting in 2012 that the 2020s would be a decade of “major upheaval.”
I’ve always been someone who has viewed history as a literary form with scientific characteristics. Reducing history to mathematical inputs and outputs arguably misses the point entirely (I’ve written something on this before). Still, if we go beyond its scientific modeling, Turchin’s concept of elite overproduction has some use.
In this piece, I’ll be tackling both the merits of the theory itself and the limitations of Turchin’s scientific history by discussing a period when elite overproduction was at an acute, practically terminal, stage. The period in question is Russia in the latter half of the 19th century. Artists and writers at the time often spoke of a resentful, educated group that was pushing the country in an unknown direction. Ideologically potent, what became of this faction and their followers ultimately turned out to be of immense consequence to world history.
An investigation into how elite overproduction unraveled Russia could also provide us with some perspective on how to assess the process in our own, present time. But more on all that shortly, because it would first be a good idea to properly define the term as Turchin understands it.
As someone who has often privileged looking at social history ‘from below,’ it is sometimes helpful to instead consider things from the vantage point of the very top. In democracies, rivalries within power itself often get misleadingly interpreted as possessing some popular character because that is the way we colloquially speak of its governance. However, given that U.S. electoral party politics has become less willing and able to integrate popular demands for decades now, perhaps an explanation ‘from above’ can be more explanatory.1
Turchin’s story of elite overproduction in the United States begins in the 1970s when workers’ wages first stopped keeping pace with productivity. You may have seen this chart before.
The resulting income inequality created not only an unprecedented gap, but the sheer number of wealthy people also increased.
As the concentration of wealth-holders increases, so do potential elite members. Turchin defines elites as “power-holders” who are able to influence behaviors by holding top posts within the four areas of social power: “military (coercion), economic, administrative or political, and ideological.”3 There’s some overlap with Turchin’s definition of “elites” and another term, the professional–managerial class (PMC).According to the research by economist Edward Wolff, from 1983 to 2010 the number of American households worth at least $10 million grew to 350,000 from 66,000.2
Naturally, as the pool of potential elite members grows, so does enrollment within higher education. But because the various centers of social power cannot absorb this larger and larger caste of people, a degree no longer necessarily grants you the status it once did. Many college graduates, even from leading universities, find themselves today chronically underemployed, indebted and despondent. This is essentially elite overproduction: an excess of overly-credentialed people and not enough positions. It causes all areas of social power to become bloated and ill-responsive, effectively working more and more as if solely for-themselves and their own longevity because they must now be hyper-competitive and guarded.
Turchin is not the first to invent this theory, but he has given it a proper name. Some of the earlier assessments of American elite power include C. Wright Mills’s The Power Elite (1956) and others. Yet, it is historian Arnold J. Toynbee’s twelve-volume A Study of History (1934-1961) that most resembles Turchin’s work, at least in spirit. He put forward a cyclical civilizational theory where creative (elite) minorities devolve into dominant (elite) minorities that worship themselves, leading to decay.4 The ruling elites insulate themselves, and become slower and less attuned to the demands of the actually-existing society under them. At the same time, Turchin would argue, more people than ever want to join their ranks. What results is institutional sclerosis and inertia, weakened state capacity, the decoupling of the state from the base of society, and many other symptoms of malaise.
Naturally, there’s many directions you can take this theory. Maybe one could even say its consequences are greatly overstated, but Turchin could not disagree more. He argues elite overproduction is a transhistorical problem not rooted in any particular period. Among his indicators, he considers it “one of the more important factors” in predicting instability across all of history.5