48 AGs, FTC Sue Facebook, Alleging Illegal Power Grabs To 'Neutralize' Rivals

ogc163

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Just read through the complaint. I don't foresee FB taking the L here; the law, the facts, resources, and the underlying neo-classical economic theory that is the foundation for Antitrust law are all in their favor. Network effects, Metcalfe's law, and increasing returns are currently not important concepts in modern antitrust law although they definitely should be. I will be pleasantly surprised if FB doesn't get the W here.
 

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‘It’s Hard to Prove’: Why Antitrust Suits Against Facebook Face Hurdles

SAN FRANCISCO — When the Federal Trade Commission and more than 40 states sued Facebook on Wednesday for illegally killing competition and demanded that the company be split apart, lawmakers and public interest groups applauded.

Senator Richard Blumenthal, Democrat of Connecticut, said, “Facebook’s reign of unaccountable, abusive practices against consumers, competitors and innovation must end.” Senator Josh Hawley, Republican of Missouri, called the lawsuits “a necessity” and said Facebook’s acquisitions of nascent rivals “were meant to be anti-competitive, and they should be broken up.”

But lawmakers and consumer advocates did not address a hard-to-deny factor: The cases against Facebook are far from a slam dunk.

Antitrust laws are complex and were put in place before the advent of modern technology. The F.T.C. and state attorneys general now face an uphill battle to prove their allegations, some competition experts said.

First, prosecutors must show that Facebook bought rivals like the photo-sharing site Instagram and the messaging service WhatsApp with the express purpose of killing off the competition. Then they must argue a theoretical: Consumers and the social media market would have been better off without the mergers.

On top of that, regulators reviewed Facebook’s acquisitions years ago and did not stop them. They will have to explain why they changed their minds now. And any company breakup may face the skepticism of courts, which have been hesitant about undoing mergers because that can sometimes cause more harm to consumers than good, some legal experts said.

Winning the cases against Facebook is “going to be a challenge because the standards of proof are formidable,” said Diana Moss, the president of the American Antitrust Institute, a left-leaning think tank and competition-law advocacy group.

Facebook, which said regulators were using antitrust laws to “punish” successful businesses, plans to fight the suits with vigor. In a memo to employees on Wednesday, Mark Zuckerberg, the company’s chief executive, said that he disagreed with the claims in the lawsuits and that the social network planned to carry on.

“Today’s news is one step in a process which could take years to play out in its entirety,” he wrote. He asked employees not to openly discuss the cases, “except with our legal team.”

Other antitrust experts said the cases would be smooth sailing. “This is straightforward and an easy case,” said Tim Wu, a professor at Columbia law school who has been part of an effort by academics, public interest groups and the Facebook co-founder Chris Hughes that is arguing for regulators to break up Facebook. Mr. Wu, a contributor to The New York Times’s opinion pages, said it would be a simple case of showing that Facebook bought Instagram and WhatsApp to maintain their dominance.

How the U.S. government and states pursue their cases against Facebook will be closely watched amid a wave of legal actions intent on limiting the power of the world’s largest tech companies. Google is battling an antitrust suit that the Justice Department filed in October, and state attorneys general are expected to soon file separate suits against it. Regulators are also investigating Apple and Amazon.

The penalties that regulators are seeking in the case against Facebook are especially onerous. They proposed that courts block future mergers and force the company to sell off Instagram and WhatsApp. Ian Conner, the F.T.C.’s head of competition enforcement, said the remedies would help restore competition and “provide a foundation for future competitors to grow and innovate without the threat of being crushed by Facebook.”

But cases challenging consummated mergers are uncommon, as are lawsuits that seek to break up companies, legal experts said. The last major antitrust lawsuit that led to divestitures was against AT&T in 1984, said William Kovacic, a former Republican chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. In that case, AT&T was ordered to sell local telecommunications companies known as Baby Bells.

Decades have passed without a similar action. That is partly because courts are often told by defendants and economists that forcing companies to sell parts of themselves is too heavy-handed, Mr. Kovacic said. “Courts historically have expressed anxiety about doing it,” he said.

Mr. Kovacic added that even though he thought the case against Facebook had merit, another difficulty for the F.T.C. and the states would be to prove that the world would have been better off if the mergers with Instagram and WhatsApp had not happened. “It’s hard to prove a hypothetical,” he said.

Facebook, however, will be able to show that Instagram and WhatsApp grew substantially after being acquired. The company has said it invested millions of dollars in the apps, helping them amass billions of users and turning them into prime communication channels around the world.

“These transactions were intended to provide better products for the people who use them, and they unquestionably did,” Jennifer Newstead, Facebook’s general counsel, wrote in a blog post on Wednesday.

One challenge the F.T.C. will face is explaining why it decided not to block Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014. Those deals, during the Obama administration, were vetted with market analysis for how they might affect competition. The acquisitions ultimately proceeded.

“It should be assumed that Facebook will seek to obtain all the internal work product that lay behind the original decisions that the acquisitions did not pose a competitive problem,” said George Hay, a law professor at Cornell University and a former antitrust official at the Justice Department.

Ms. Newstead signaled that the previous regulatory reviews of the WhatsApp and Instagram deals would be key to Facebook’s defense, calling the acquisitions “settled law” and blasting the regulators for wanting a “do over.”

Mr. Zuckerberg also indicated in his memo to employees that the government’s definition of competition was too narrow. In its complaint, the F.T.C. said Facebook dominated social networking, with more than three billion people globally using one of its apps every month. In their complaint, the state attorneys general said Facebook’s behavior was born out of a fear of losing that position of dominance.

But Mr. Zuckerberg said Facebook was fighting a far larger ecosystem of competitors that went beyond social networking, including “Google, Twitter, Snapchat, iMessage, TikTok, YouTube and more consumer apps, to many others in advertising.” That is because Facebook and its other apps are used for communication and entertainment, such as streaming video and gaming. Against that broader universe, the company said, competition is healthy.

Even if the F.T.C. and states prove their cases against Facebook, there remains a question of whether the company can even disentangle WhatsApp and Instagram from its core social networking business.

Mr. Zuckerberg for years operated WhatsApp, Instagram and Messenger independently, but he announced he would unite their underlying infrastructures last year so that they would work together better. That way, someone could send a private message from his or her Instagram account to a friend using Facebook Messenger, and the two services would communicate seamlessly.

Knitting these systems together is technically complicated, which means they would also be technically complicated to undo. In September, 18 months after the initial announcement that the apps would work together, Facebook unveiled the integration of Instagram and its Messenger services. The company anticipates that it may take even longer to complete the technical work for stitching together WhatsApp with its other apps.

Facebook has not said whether the suits will affect these efforts. Mr. Zuckerberg said that in any case, the company intended to plow ahead with its day-to-day business.

“We work hard to build products that people find valuable, and we’ve built a strong business by serving millions of small businesses around the world,” he wrote in the internal memo. “That isn’t changing.”

‘It’s Hard to Prove’: Why Antitrust Suits Against Facebook Face Hurdles

Very easy to prove imo. Just go to any website in the world, then check to see what trackers were blocked. You all know what three companies are always gonna be the answer.
 

ogc163

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Just read through the complaint. I don't foresee FB taking the L here; the law, the facts, resources, and the underlying neo-classical economic theory that is the foundation for Antitrust law are all in their favor. Network effects, Metcalfe's law, and increasing returns are currently not important concepts in modern antitrust law although they definitely should be. I will be pleasantly surprised if FB doesn't get the W here.

:francis::yeshrug:
 

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Just read through the complaint. I don't foresee FB taking the L here; the law, the facts, resources, and the underlying neo-classical economic theory that is the foundation for Antitrust law are all in their favor. Network effects, Metcalfe's law, and increasing returns are currently not important concepts in modern antitrust law although they definitely should be. I will be pleasantly surprised if FB doesn't get the W here.
Why do you think this?
 

ogc163

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Why do you think this?

The theories that Antitrust law is built on didn't consider network effects, the guy behind network effects/increasing returns is W. Brian Arthur and his ideas were dismissed as crazy as it went against the mainstream concept of economies of scale/diminishing returns.

The issue is that an economy of scale model generally fits when you are dealing with capital intensive companies but not when you are dealing with companies whose advantages are software and relationship based.
 

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The theories that Antitrust law is built on didn't consider network effects, the guy behind network effects/increasing returns is W. Brian Arthur and his ideas were dismissed as crazy as it went against the mainstream concept of economies of scale/diminishing returns.

The issue is that an economy of scale model generally fits when you are dealing with capital intensive companies but not when you are dealing with companies whose advantages are software and relationship based.
But those aspects are intrinsic to social networking itself no? not a company… and unavoidable.
Every social network would be guilty, meaning no one is guilty.
 

ogc163

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But those aspects are intrinsic to social networking itself no? not a company… and unavoidable.
Every social network would be guilty, meaning no one is guilty.

While network effects are intrinsic, growth at the scale of FB is not intrinsic or typical.

On another note, I think many on the left are overly excited about the hiring of Tim Wu and Lina Kahn and will be disappointed when they leave D.C. and the status quo is maintained.
 

ogc163

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Antitrust posturing — Benedict Evans

"You give me the awful impression, I hate to have to say it, of someone who hasn't read any of the arguments against your position ever." - Christopher Hitchens

Late last year the US congress's antitrust committee held a series of hearings, and produced a 400 page report, on competition issues around big tech platforms. The report, co-authored by the new FTC nominee Lina Khan, essentially claimed that these companies are collectively the new Standard Oil, crushing competition and squeezing out innovation across many different fronts.

Unfortunately, this report was also, to be charitable, very rushed, with great chunks of advocacy pasted in without any scrutiny, and with significant errors of fact every few pages. Perhaps the worst example of this was the claim that tech startup creation has 'sharply declined' in the last decade. This is an important claim, and if it was true we would obviously need broad and urgent intervention - but in fact, it was based on a data set that ended in 2011, which was both nine years out of data and just at the end of the financial crisis. People in tech agree on very little, but everyone would agree we're in the hottest market for tech startup creation in history - any relevant data would tell you that tech startup creation has actually risen by three to four times in the last decade.

This report has now been followed by five proposed tech antitrust bills, published on Friday. Given the background, and the current US political environment, these are aggressive. However, like the report, they contain a mix of real concerns, good ideas, and some pretty questionable logic.

The five bills, with their aims, are as follows:

  1. Merger Filing Fee Modernisation Act: raising funds to pay for more rigorous antitrust enforcement

  2. Access Act: user data portability

  3. American Choice and Innovation Online Act: steering and self-preferencing of services

  4. Ending Platform Monopolies Act: bundling, private label, and platform companies competing with services on their platforms

  5. Platform Competition and Opportunity Act: a ban on all M&A
Bills 2 to 5 apply to companies that are a 'covered platform', which is defined as a company that has either net revenue or market cap of at least $600bn and either 50m US consumer MAUs or 100k US business MAUs.*

Collectively, these bills are a catalogue of most of the major arguments made against large consumer tech companies in the last few years, and of the remedies that have been proposed. Unfortunately, some of them also show little sign that their authors have engaged with or even read any of the discussion we've all had around those ideas. I've listed these bills roughly in order of how coherent they are (the first is out of my scope).

Data portability. No company wants to make it easy for you to switch to a competitor, and many regulators are exploring data portability requirements of some kind, from making it easy to export your photos from Facebook, to moving business operations data between enterprise software tools. So, this bill would require covered platforms to make APIs to let you export your data to another tool in some reasonably standardised way, and give the FTC a mandate to regulate that.

What is 'data', though? Four questions:

  • First, much of this data is highly specific to a given software company's product and infrastructure (and its relation to millions of other users), so the practical value to anyone else might be quite limited. Two competing products might create data from customer inputs in unusably differently ways.

  • Second, who owns that data, exactly? if I 'like' your Instagram photo, is that my data or yours? That doesn't have a simple answer. How much of 'your' data is yours to export?

  • Third, how will this work? We don't know - the bill is 15 page long and punts all the questions to the FTC, which is supposed to just work all this out. So, we have a law that says you must make X portable, without defining X.

  • Finally, one could argue that this doesn't address the most important kind of data - network effects. If I want to compete with Instagram, I don't just need your photos - I need your entire social graph and all your friends activity (and, to repeat, that's not 'your' data to give me). If I want to compete with Google search, I don't need your search history - I need raw search and click data for millions of users. That's where the real competitive value of data lies, and that's not addressed here at all.
Steering, self-preferencing and competing on your platform. Google puts its own restaurant data above Yelp in search results, Apple bans Spotify from asking for a credit card or even telling you that's an option, and Amazon makes private label products that compete with its suppliers. Platforms compete with other people on their own platform. This is a problem, so we should ban it, right? Well, yes and no.

Two of the laws proposed on Friday address these questions ("American Choice' and 'Ending Platform Monopolies'). The first is aimed narrowly and specifically at self-preferencing and steering. Apple could no longer require apps to use in-app payment or ban them from offering a credit card sign-up, and Amazon would be banned from favouring its own products over third parties' in the store. The EU has already made simular decisions, and I've written elsewhere (starting in 2011!) that I think Apple's position on in-app payment and customer communication is a problem. This law, or something like it, looks like a question of how and when, not if, and I wrote a detailed discussion of resetting the App Store here.

So, that law is pretty sensible. Unfortunately, the 'Ending Platform Monopolies' law is impossibly broad. Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft would be banned from doing anything on their platforms that anyone else might do, and from anything that might be a conflict of interest. They would not just be banned from favouring their own products - they'd be banned from having any products at all that they could theoretically favour.

This of course comes from a framing that 'if you own a platform you can't compete on it' - Apple or Google should not have any products or features that compete with companies on their platforms. That sounds very clear - Elizabeth Warren made it a mantra. But what if I want to sell a camera app for your iPhone? OK, so Apple can't include a camera app - or a clock, or an email app, or indeed a user interface or a file system. An Android phone has its own TCP/IP stack (in the 90s Windows did not, and you had to buy one), but other people would like to sell you that if it wasn't there, so that's a clear conflict of interest and has to go.

There's a very basic misunderstanding at play here - you can't ban a platform from having 'any' feature, service or product that someone else might want to make, because that describes literally every single thing that a platform does. There is, to repeat, a very real problem here - this was the whole Microsoft/Netscape case. You can certainly carve out specific issues, such as Apple Music, or private label on Amazon, though as I wrote here, worrying about private label is a pretty irrational moral panic. But, you'll need to spend a lot more time thinking about how this stuff works and what the word 'platform' really means, because this law wouldn't just ban Apple Music and Google Maps - it would ban iOS and Android. I wrote in detail about the bundling problem here.

Banning M&A. The last law released on Friday is a very straightforward ban on any acquisition of a company that competes with you, or that might in the future, or of any company that might make your products better in any way. Since these are the only reasons to do M&A, this is simply a blanket ban on Google, Apple, Amazon, Facebook or Microsoft buying any company, of any kind, ever again. We all understand the concern with Facebook's acquisition of Instagram and the desire to subject such deals to much greater scrutiny, but it's hard to dignify this proposal as more than neo-Trumpian posturing.

So.

Setting aside the detail, what lessons can we learn from this? There's no question that there are business practices all over large tech companies that are bad for competition and should be regulated. This is all coming. However, there are also business practices that are bad for individual competitors but good for the consumer and often indeed good for broader competition. And more fundamentally, there are many decisions that are deeply bound up in trade-offs between the product, privacy, competition, ease of use, profitability, innovation, portability and many other things. If you want to solve the problems, you need to understand why they exist and accept that there will be complexity.

When people in tech say 'you don't understand - it's complicated', a common and easy reaction is to think that this is special pleading - a claim that somehow the law should not apply to tech. But in fact, it's the exact opposite - this is a plea that tech policy has the same complexity and trade-offs as any other field of policy. We would all understand that you cannot solve car safety or traffic congestion with a five page bill, and that breaking up GM would solve about two of the fifty reasons we worry about cars. We understand that education policy, energy policy or healthcare policy are complicated and full of trade-offs, and that the only people who think it's simple and easy have their fingers in their ears. Unfortunately, those people wrote some of these bills.

* People with lawyerly minds will note that you could get under the $600bn cap by swapping equity for debt (this is what EV is for, kids), and ask whether 'business MAUs' means customers or seats - a lot of enterprise software companies have 100k seats. Equally, anyone who's read the US constitution will recall the clause that forbids a 'bill of attainder' - a legislative act that singles out an individual or group for punishment without a trial. Does a law that singles out five particular companies without any analysis or qualitative discussion fit that definition?

Antitrust posturing — Benedict Evans
 
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