April 30 marked 40 years since the end of Vietnam, nobody said a thing

[tru_m.a.c]

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32527645

Vietnam PM: US 'committed barbarous crimes' during war

Vietnam's prime minister has spoken of "countless barbarous crimes" committed by the US during the Vietnam War.

Nguyen Tan Dung was speaking at an event in Ho Chi Minh City to mark the 40th anniversary of the end of the war.

On 30 April 1975 the city - which was then called Saigon and was the capital of South Vietnam - was captured by communist troops from the North.

Three million Vietnamese, and 58,000 US soldiers died in the war. But the US and Vietnam now have diplomatic ties.

Speaking in front of the former Presidential Palace Mr Dung said: "[The US] committed countless barbarous crimes, caused immeasurable losses and pain to our people and country".

"Our homeland had to undergo extremely serious challenges."

Some in Vietnam are still suffering from deformities and the lasting effects of the dioxin Agent Orange, sprayed by the US Air Force into the thick jungle used as cover by northern guerrilla forces.

Soldiers and veterans
Eventually the US-backed South was defeated and the North's tanks smashed through the gates of the palace in Ho Chi Minh City ending the conflict. The reunification process was completed the next year.

Vietnam's relationship with the US has changed significantly since then. They now have diplomatic ties and are trade partners.

On Thursday, regiments of soldiers and war veterans took park in an elaborate commemorative parade to pay tribute to those who fought and died in the long conflict.

Many of those taking part in the events are too young to remember the war

It was a fun and festive atmosphere

Troops paraded through the city in dress uniform

Huong Ly, BBC World Service
When I was 16 months old my mother went to war. Duong Thi Xuan Quy became North Vietnam's first female war correspondent, but - and it's a familiar story in a country where three million died - she never came home.

We are still searching for her remains.

Read the full story: Searching for the truth about my mother

The Vietnamese national flag was widely visible

War veterans also took part in the parade
The North's victory reunited Vietnam under the communist government.

The war was very divisive in the US as well, as it was the first to be extensively covered by US TV. It was also the first to be lost by a modern global superpower.

Hundreds of thousands of people left the South in the years that followed the war, some risking their lives on dangerous boat journeys. Most of them ended up resettling in the US, UK, France and other countries.

The Vietnam War

1954 - Geneva Accords signed dividing Vietnam in two - the communist North helps guerrillas in the South fight US backed Southern troops

1964 - US bombs targets in North Vietnam

1965 - The first US combat troops arrive in Vietnam

1973 - The Paris Peace Accords on "Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" are signed, officially ending direct US involvement - but fighting between North and South continues

30 April 1975 - North Vietnamese troops enter Saigon - South Vietnam is controlled by communist forces and the country is reunited ending the war

 

[tru_m.a.c]

I wrote this on my fb page when I realized there were very few mentions of the anniversary and its relevance to our current political climate

April 30,2015 marked 40 years since the end of the Vietnam War. As we continue to march and protest against policies and procedures that leave our communities and our people vulnerable to acts of violence, it's important that we gather inspiration from an often overlooked era of American history.

Despite it's connection with the Civil Rights movement and all of the other social movements of its day, Vietnam has become a footnote in history. Schools teach it during the last month of class when kids no longer give a fukk. Most people alive to experience Vietnam don't even talk about it anymore. You won't see any news reports talking about the 58,000+ Americans that died in Vietnam. You won't see any news reports about the massacres suffered by civilians at the hands of US troops. You won't see any news reports discussing LBJ and Nixon falsifying evidence. You won't see a single picture of a charred human body (very common btw). You will not see a single story on the effect the draft and the war itself had on Baltimore, let alone an entire generation of Black Americans. (As I've stated before, I have family that fought in Vietnam)

It goes without saying that I'm not surprised with the media's coverage of Baltimore's history. As with all issues involving race, white america skips everything between the current year, the civil rights act, and the civil war. But I've always felt there is something especially sinister about the way America pretends that the 50s, 60s, and 70s don't exist. Well, let me take that back, that is unless you're talking about baseball, basketball and football. You'd have a much deeper, more meaningful conversation, discussing the AFL-NFL merger than you would any social movement during those decades. Like I said, you have probably not seen one report on Vietnam, but I bet you know who your football team drafted last night.....

So as you continue to watch the coverage of Freddie Gray in disbelief at how oblivious and racially insensitive America can be, don't be completely dismayed (lol sarcasm)! Just understand that this is a symptom of a bigger problem America has with recognizing injustice and admitting painful truths (special shout out to all my colleges that name their school buildings after KKK members and white supremacist - y'all the real MVP's *tear*). Remember this one thing: Alive right now is a generation of Americans who had to be persuaded to adopt the civil rights act, voted for Vietnam, turned the other way for Iran contra affair, voted for mandatory minimums, voted against every effort to stabilize the middle class, voted for the war in Iraq, and are probably ready to go to war against Iran. Imagine how dumb, dense and stupid you have to be to engage in that trifecta.

 

[Truth200]

A bunch of people died for no reason what's to talk about.

 

[Billy Hoyle]

My grandad was in Korea. Dude had half his foot blown off while the rest of his platoon died in the same attack. Had night terrors the rest of his life and developed an awful drinking problem.

All for something that is most commonly known as "the Forgotten War."

And now we have another generation of people facing the exact same issue.

 

[Truth200]

My grandad was in Korea. Dude had half his foot blown off while the rest of his platoon died in the same attack. Had night terrors the rest of his life and developed an awful drinking problem.

All for something that is most commonly known as "the Forgotten War."

And now we have another generation of people facing the exact same issue.

Join the Army and have your chance at life ruined for nothing brehs...

 

[Red Shield]

America doesn't want to admit to any losses or any of the bad shyt it does. So of course it ain't gonna talk about nam.

Probably doesn't even want to be reminded of it by outside parties

 

[Mr.bocario]

My grandad was in Korea. Dude had half his foot blown off while the rest of his platoon died in the same attack. Had night terrors the rest of his life and developed an awful drinking problem.

All for something that is most commonly known as "the Forgotten War."

And now we have another generation of people facing the exact same issue.

Its forgotten here in america. But every year the south Korean govt will fly a Korean war veteran and his family to south Korea to honor them.

 

[CHL]

You just know that if @Napoleon was alive then he would have been supporting the war.

 

[tru_m.a.c]

How Young Vietnamese View the Vietnam War
"I don't care much about capitalism or communism. What will leaders do for our country?"

Today, April 30, red flags are festooning the streets of Hanoi, the Vietnamese capital, to mark the fourth decade since the U.S.-backed South Vietnamese government surrendered to communist North Vietnamese troops and ended the Vietnam War. But most Vietnamese are too young to remember the day in 1975 when Saigon fell, celebrated in Hanoi as Reunification Day. For the nearly 70 percent of the population under age 40, April 30 is just a day off from work or school.

“No one our age talks about it,” Hien, a recent university graduate from Hanoi who gave only her first name, told me. “Most young people nowadays don’t really care about what happened. They just want to have fun.”

Forty years after millions of Vietnamese were killed in the war, in which more than 58,000 Americans also died, locals I’ve spoken with bear little animosity toward the United States. During the three years I spent in Hanoi, I never witnessed hostility toward Americans. When I told Vietnamese I came from the U.S., they would smile and talk about American celebrities, like the pre-teen who told me she loved Beyoncé or the parking-lot attendant who shook my hand enthusiastically: “Ah, Obama!”


The Vietnam War, as Seen by the Victors

Vietnamese millennials have grown up without direct experience of what they call the “American War,” though many lost grandparents in the fighting. An estimated 300,000 soldiers remain missing, and those whose relatives died still feel their absence keenly. “My parents talk a lot about the war,” said Nguyen Thi Huong, 20, a university student in Hanoi whose grandfather died in the conflict. But she does not take part in those conversations. “Old people often reminisce. We young people can't relate, so we mind our own business.”

Like Nguyen, I never lived through the war. But none of my close relatives fought in Vietnam. My AP U.S. History textbook contained only four pages about the conflict, and my class ran out of time to cover the 1970s in detail. So I got my information from books like Fire in the Lake and films like The Deer Hunter andApocalypse Now.


And unlike me, my Vietnamese contemporaries grew up in the communist country that the war created. That country has changed dramatically over the course of their lives. When Nguyen and Hien were children, Vietnam had just begun to integrate into the global economy following a postwar decade of scarcity and stagnation. Since then, Vietnam has become one of East Asia’s fastest-growing economies, and the government's staunch communism has given way to a new pragmatism as it privatizes state-owned companies and seeks foreign investment. A recent Pew survey found that 95 percent of the Vietnamese people support free-market capitalism—a higher percentage than in any other country surveyed, including the United States. As a Hanoi secretary in her 30s told me: “The war is the past already. ... We care only about money. We don’t care about politics or history.”

* * *

Students in Hanoi learn about the American War for the first time in elementary school, taking class trips to the capital’s Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum—which houses the embalmed remains of the communist leader who led the war for independence against the French—and Military History Museum. In the following years, they study the conflict in the context of the country’s history of fighting colonial powers, from its 10th-century rebellion against China to its war against France beginning in the 1940s. “Each year, we learn the same thing in more detail. America started the war to help France get Vietnam back,” university student Luong Tuan Bach, 19, told me from a bench beside Hanoi’s Hoan Kiem Lake, where he sells Coca-Cola and iced tea to passing tourists to earn spending money.

Luong said he felt these lessons were important, and cited a well-known Ho Chi Minh poem:“Our people have to know our history.” But other young people I spoke with complained that history classes are too dry and tedious to make a lasting impression. “We started learning about the war in sixth grade, but I don't remember much. History is too boring, just texts after texts,” Nguyen Thi Huong, the university student, said.

Those texts, which, as Hien recalled, depict a “hard but glorious”struggle to defeat the American invaders, present the official Vietnamese view. “We learned that even though the U.S. army was really mighty and their weapons were really modern, the Vietnamese country united and stood up for our freedom,” Thuy, a university student in Hanoi, told me.

estimated 1.1 million North Vietnamese soldiers and Viet Cong guerrillas who died—a common omission, according to locals I spoke to. “It's war, so Americans have propaganda and we have it too. It’s inevitable,” retired high-school teacher Le Van Bon, 81, told me.

When these textbooks briefly turn their gaze toward the United States, according to the young Vietnamese I spoke with,they focus on the antiwar movement, crediting American protesters with changing U.S. national sentiment and putting pressure on the government to end the war. They do not inform students that a handful of North Vietnamese also protested the war; the existence of these protesters, and the punishment they faced for their opposition, challenge the narrative of national unity. And unlike my AP History book, the Vietnamese textbook I read contained little information about the Cold War ideology that motivated the United States to enter the conflict. Today, some young Vietnamese recognize that these books may not tell the whole story. As Hau, a university student, told me: “All the history books are written by the government, so they include 80 percent of the truth. The other 20 percent is left out.”


This inspires some to seek alternative sources of history. Pham Duong, 34, owns a jewelry store and grew up hearing war stories from his grandfather, who fought against both the French and the Americans during his two decades in the army. “When I was young, I learned that the Americans were bad and the French were bad,” Pham told me. Today, he has “a lot of” American friends, and has sought out a broader perspective via the Internet—specifically American-made war documentaries on YouTube. “I had the chance to look at both sides. I realized that in war, the winner can say whatever they want.”

But he doesn’t think many of his peers are interested in such research. “Not many young Vietnamese want to think about it. They think it’s too complicated,” Pham said.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/youth-vietnam-war-fall-saigon/391769/

 

[tru_m.a.c]

Setting the record straight on the end of the Vietnam War (4): Facts are important

• BY THOMAS E. RICKS
• APRIL 20, 2015
• 

By Arnold R. Isaacs
Best Defense guest historian

Closing thoughts for this trip down Vietnam memory lane:

— A key fallacy in the we-won mythology is that it pictures the war as an American event, whose outcome was decided entirely by American actions and decisions. It gives no weight to the character, strategies, strengths and shortcomings of either our enemy or our ally. It ignores relevant Vietnamese realities such as the endemic corruption that drained away South Vietnam’s political and military strength — for example, the diversion of huge amounts of fuel, medicine and other supplies sold off on the black market (with significant quantities ending up in enemy hands), or the common practice of keeping dead and wounded soldiers or deserters on official rosters so that commanders could continue pocketing their salaries. As a result of those practices, the real number of troops available for duty in many units was half or less than was listed on charts at higher headquarters, while supplies — fuel in particular — were often not available where they were supposed to be. Corruption undermined leadership, too. With command positions regularly purchased and used for personal gain, promotions were not based on courage and military competence but often, exactly the reverse.

— Similarly, the revisionists ignore the economic catastrophe — equivalent in its effects to America’s Great Depression — that demoralized South Vietnam in 1973 and 1974. That downturn had almost nothing to do with the cuts in U.S. aid. It reflected a disastrous combination of events: the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs with the closing of U.S. bases, while successive years of poor harvests and the Mideast oil embargo led to sharp rises in rice and fuel prices. Skyrocketing living costs brought hardship and hunger to both soldiers and civilians. Desertions soared in the army, where a soldier’s pay was no longer enough to buy rice for his family. So did black-market sales of military supplies. The devastated economy was another major factor in the 1975 collapse, but almost always goes unmentioned in the revisionists’ tunnel-vision history.

That history, and the “Congress lost Vietnam” myth that derives from it, brings to mind a story about Confederate general George Pickett’s response when he was asked why the South lost the Civil War. According to historian Ronald Spector, Pickett supposedly answered: “Well, I kinda think the Yankees had a little something to do with it.” The Vietnamese, both our allies and our enemies, had a little something to do with the American shipwreck in Vietnam, too.

It is not hard to understand why a fictitious, feel-good history has taken such hold in America’s memories of Vietnam. Putting all the blame on Congress, war protesters and left-wingers for the defeat exonerates those who were actually responsible for U.S. policy and those who conducted the war; not surprisingly, that makes it a popular argument among former U.S. policymakers and military commanders. The myth that not only were U.S. military forces not defeated in battle (true, more or less, but also irrelevant, as a North Vietnamese officer told an anguished American in the war’s last days), but that the American military effort was actually successful, and that U.S. troops left Vietnam having beaten the enemy they came to fight, is comforting for veterans and for a country that wants to admire and respect its soldiers. But making ourselves feel better is not a valid reason for remembering a false history.

The factual record shows beyond any reasonable doubt that America did not win in Vietnam. Nor was the war lost because a successful effort was undermined by opposition at home. The defeat was due to flawed policies rooted in a profoundly faulty understanding of both our enemy and our ally, a consistent refusal to face unwelcome facts on the ground, and a highly unrealistic idea of what military force can accomplish. Also beyond doubt is that four decades later, remembering those painful truths is not just a matter of seeing the past more clearly. They are unmistakably relevant to today’s conflicts as well. The more we refuse to see the facts of those earlier mistakes, the more we risk repeating them — in wars where the stakes are far higher and failure carries far greater dangers than Vietnam ever did.

 

[tru_m.a.c]

VOICE
Memories of Vietnam (III): Bombing our way out of being encircled by the VC

• BY THOMAS E. RICKS
• APRIL 16, 2015
• 

By Col. Keith Nightingale, U.S. Army (ret.)
Best Defense guest memoirist

We ceded our right (East) flank on the river and drew closer toward the center. Our center lost the two main trench lines and we were forced back to the edge of the jungle basecamp clearing. This became increasingly difficult as it allowed the VC 51 caliber’s to fire with great effect. The Rangers were forced to hug the ground and seek cover behind any low root or ground. No one could raise their head more than six inches without risking a hit. While the BDQ was forced closer together, the concentrated enemy fire made it increasingly difficult to effectively defend the position.

At this time, the first helicopter gunships arrived. It was at the cusp of daylight and the gunners could not yet clearly separate VC from Rangers. I called for the first run and the initial tracer rounds stitched our rear. I can clearly remember lying on the ground behind the tree and watching in a very detached manner the line of red tracers sew a pattern from well behind me in a line less than a yard from my body as it stitched its way toward the enemy. I told the gunners to make the same run and delay their fire for 2 seconds. The second pass was perfect. It was almost as if this very near miss was quite minor compared to the other near misses which had preceded it.

Hiep now saw that we were in a truly desperate situation and called in his company commanders. MACV had begun to stack up tactical airstrikes and the L19 was circling them at various altitudes overhead and sending them against the oxbow land south of the river and the edge of the basecamp as their fuel ran low. To this point, the canopy still hid the positions from the air but the leaves and trees were beginning to disappear from the combined effects of mortars, artillery, airstrikes and small arms. I had begun to refire the 175mm as it had a very great effect even if we took occasional casualties from a short round. A 175mm makes a very large hole and its sound was one of the few comforts we had at the moment. By this time, 0630, we probably occupied a circular perimeter less than a 100 meters in width and 50 meters in depth.

Hiep’s plan, as briefed to me by Captain Shine, was born of desperation and would require a degree of courage and discipline that few units in the world could muster. The Second Company, the center of the line and the most heavily engaged, would assault the attacking VC, concurrent with an airstrike on our Eastern (Right/my) flank. Then, the L19 would bring in continuous airstrikes right behind that and leading toward the original LZ. We would leapfrog behind each bomb strike to the new craters and move toward safety-hoping the VC could not follow the bombline.

All the company commanders shook Hiep’s hand and went back to their positions. When Cpt Shine told Hiep the airstrikes were inbound, Hiep gave the command to charge to the Second Company Commander (Tuy Uy Tang). He fired a .45 round into his PRC 25 radio dial and ordered the assault. At this time, several things happened very quickly.

At the moment of the order, the VC commander in the center whistled his troops to begin their assault against us. His whistle drew the attention of our Montagnard M60 gunner who hit him squarely in the chest (I remember the sound of his breath going one way, then abruptly the other). Second Company ran directly into a line of VC massed to move forward and completely caught them by surprise, stopping their momentum.

The VC were organized in lines of massed soldiers at each trench. The lead element closest to us would raise up, fire at full automatic and shower grenades and move forward as far as their momentum could carry them. The lines behind would rise up and run forward to the just emptied trenches. In this manner, they kept pressuring us to the rear–but at a great cost to themselves. By this time, most engagements were less than five yards apart and most within a yard. No movement was possible-you held the position or you were overrun.

At the moment of the Second Company assault, the first airstrikes rolled in our right flank. The L19 pilot shouted that it had hit a major VC force. The initial bombs exploded the canopy and opened up the ground to view for the first time. The second set landed squarely in the middle of a battalion just getting on line to assault our flank (my side). We were unaware of its existence and had it attacked, we would have been wiped out.

From then on, everything happened very quickly. The Second Company assault bought enough time for the rest of us to swing to the East behind them and move with the exploding bombs which now rained in a continuous stream. (We were later told that we had 72 tactical airstrikes in 45 minutes-something of an Air Force record). We had napalm (God bless Dow Chemical!), cluster bomblets, 250, 500, 750 and 1,000 pound bombs from everything ranging from VNAF A1E’s to Canberras to F4’s.The sound was deafening and it showered us with mud, splinters and leaves for the entire trek back to our start point. This period is just a haze of noise, adrenaline, dirt and disconnected rapid movements until we broke out into sunlight on the edge of the burned LZ where we had started the day prior.

Within 20 minutes of the initial assault, we assembled as many people as we could find while moving toward safety. Many Rangers carried wounded comrades and everyone was very quiet and focused. At one point, Hiep turned to me after some AK 47 shots were heard to say that the VC were shooting the wounded.

Eventually, we found our way back to the same rubber plantation woodline we had left the day before. We formed a small circle behind a large fallen log, expecting the VC to attack at any moment. I lit a Pall Mall and walked around the perimeter reporting to Cpt Shine I was able to count only 32 Rangers out of the 450 we had the previous day. We had not yet met any friendly forces but at least could see open terrain and the sky was full of helicopters and aircraft. The L19 also informed us that the 11th ACR had artillery within range and I began to adjust in our perimeter. Hiep asked me to cease fire as he was afraid we would hit our soldiers trying to join us that had become separated.

Later that day, the Commander of the 48th directed Hiep to join him less than a hundred yards from our position. I remember being incensed that they didn’t come to us. Walking to their position and seeing them all resting in fresh uniforms and eating, we (all the U.S.) refused to talk to their U.S. counterparts who quickly made themselves scarce. Hiep delivered a tongue lashing to the Colonel (who ranked him by two levels) and we abruptly left.

Soon, APC’s from the 48th joined us and we slept in a single perimeter. That night, we were awakened and flattened to the ground as a B52 Arclight strike hit the basecamp and another target. I clearly remember being thrown to the ground and watching the earth literally roll toward me in successive waves as the bomb shockwaves moved the earth.

The next day, the 25th, we retraced our steps now with the 11th ACR and the 48th. We followed the bombline edge and eventually came back to the camp. It was now fully exposed in sunlight and we could, for the first time, see its extent. There were at least five major zigzag trenches, each anchored by large low offset bunkers at the corners and one in the center. Each bunker had firing ports on the oblique providing interlocking fire throughout the position. Between each trenchline, was a cooking bunker and sleeping or command bunkers. The position could easily absorb a regiment or more. The edge of the front was cleared less than 5 yards from the jungle making it virtually impossible to see until an intruder was in the band of defensive fires.

Throughout the battlefield, were arrayed the bodies of the combatants. Stacks of VC lay in every trench and the ground between trenches. Parts of people and equipment were scattered in the shattered stumps of trees and limbs as so much leaves. In many cases, it was extremely hard to differentiate between Rangers and VC due to the violence.

However, some things were very clear. The identifiable Rangers were all facing toward the basecamp — their direction of fire. Here and there, you could see clear signs where individual Rangers had tried to clear a low spot in the ground with their arms and legs from the low grazing fire. In daylight, the marks on the dirt were much like what kids make creating angels in the snow.

We began the task of separating and loading the Ranger dead for evacuation and massing the VC for on site burial. The VC were uniformly young and obviously fresh new replacements. They were probably between the ages of 16 and 18 and all had short cut hair and new equipment and black pajamas. I imagine this was their first combat.

The day was exceptionally hot, especially in the newly opened canopy direct sunlight. Soon we were visited by various Generals wanting to see the battlefield. The senior General of the day was the CG of the RVN Marines who was clearly moved and appreciative. He spent considerable time talking to Hiep and the Rangers and was profoundly effected by what he saw.

In the course of the day, I was shown a grouping of bodies. It was a Ranger medic bent over another Ranger. He had been shot in the head by a VC as he was tending his wounded buddy. Many VC and Rangers were pulled off of each other attesting to the hand to hand combat. Where Second Company had made its assault, groups of both sides were intermingled in the center of the camp. I recall thinking how close we all were yet how little we each were aware of events beyond the reach of our physical accessibility. In my memory, what was happening within yards of me clearly went unnoticed.

Toward the end, one of the Rangers brought me to one of the last trenches in the position. In the bottom, lay what looked like a sleeping girl. It was a dead VC nurse with long hair draped across her cheek and covering her side almost to her waist. The soldiers, from the 48th, were looking at her and talking. I got a body bag and placed her inside. Insofar as I know, she was the only VC we evacuated for burial. The rest and what parts we could not identify, we buried in the trenches.

Several days later, a “victory” ceremony was held in Xuan Loc to recognize the Rangers.Cpt Shine had to talk to us very sternly to insure we didn’t say anything bad about the 48th and to smile. I know Hiep had the same problem with his men. For the rest of the month, lost Rangers began to wander back. Eventually, we had around 200 of the original battalion back. In one famous incident reported in Armor magazine, an 11th ACR helicopter spotted a figure standing in the jungle. It swooped low and the door gunner identified it as a Vietnamese waving a rag. The helicopter, covered by a gunship, landed. Walking slowly out of the brush was a Ranger NCO with another Ranger on his back. The NCO had a sucking chest wound that was bleeding and no boots. Over his right shoulder was his wounded buddy and on his left shoulder was both their TA 50 and rifles. They had been evading the VC and seeking recovery for more than five days–Rangers in anybody’s book!

In Christmas of 1968, several Second Company Rangers were released by the VC as a goodwill gesture. They reported that they had been captured after the escape assault and moved across the Dong Nai to a larger basecamp where they said they had seen both Chinese and Russian advisors. They also said the B-52 strike on the first night had hit part of the basecamp and resulted in the death of a major VC or NVA general. They reported that they had to divert their movement to take the body to the border where it was evacuated by helicopter to the North. We had no reason not to believe them.

After this, we were sent to Trang Bang Ranger Training Center for refitting. The action went largely unnoticed by the US media and there was no follow-up on the part of MACV for lessons learned or other potentially useful information. It was just another day at work.

 

[tru_m.a.c]

VOICE
Setting the record straight on the end of the Vietnam War (3): Not a lost victory

• BY THOMAS E. RICKS
• APRIL 16, 2015
• 

By Arnold R. Isaacs
Best Defense guest historian

Did we really win in Vietnam? Some more facts to remember about the final years:

— Beside the claimed victory over the Viet Cong, the other key premise of the we-really-won narrative is that South Vietnamese forces on the ground and U.S. forces in the air decisively defeated the major North Vietnamese offensive in 1972, proving that the policy of Vietnamizing the war had worked. In that telling, the war on the ground was effectively won when the January 1973 peace agreement was negotiated. But that claim is not supported by the facts. The South Vietnamese recaptured the one province capital that was occupied by the enemy (though completely destroying it in the process) and managed to defend the two others that were threatened. But they permanently lost a chain of bases in the mountainous hinterland, leaving the Communists more strongly entrenched than ever in their traditional base areas. And South Vietnamese casualties, nearly twice as many as in any previous year of the war, were so high that some divisions, including several of the best ones, had still not recovered in morale or combat effectiveness by the time of the next and final Communist offensive in 1975. Casualties and destruction also permanently depressed civilian morale. At the same time, the Communist side also fell far short of its goals despite huge losses. Far from the decisive victory pictured in revisionist myth, the bloody 1972 fighting only recreated the old stalemate at a higher level of violence, in which South Vietnam’s national will and fragile institutions continued to weaken over the next three years.

— A key question the revisionists don’t answer is this: if things were so peachy at the end of 1972, why did the United States, after insisting for five years that any peace settlement must include withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South, have to drop that demand (over the desperate resistance of its ally in Saigon) in order to get an agreement? If we really had the war won, why couldn’t President Nixon and his negotiator Henry Kissinger settle on their terms without making such a major concession? The question answers itself: by definition, the compromise on that issue means the war wasn’t won after all. On the other side, Hanoi met Washington’s concession with an equally fundamental one of its own, dropping its long-standing demand that the South Vietnamese regime be disarmed and dismantled as part of the ceasefire process. That is to say, they hadn’t won either.

— Once the Paris agreement was signed, the revisionist accounts put all or nearly all the blame on North Vietnam for its failure to bring peace. But the truth, obvious to anyone who was there and was not completely blinded by ideological loyalty to one side or the other, is that the agreement’s breakdown was an entirely mutual affair. Neither side observed the letter or spirit of the ceasefire. Neither took a single step toward carrying out the agreement’s political provisions, which were supposed to lead to free national elections and eventual reunification. Both continued to deny all political rights to their opponents and to outlaw the expression of opposing ideas. On other issues, one might sympathize more with one side than the other. But by any possible reading of the facts, the blame for destroying the peace agreement falls equally on both.

 

[tru_m.a.c]

Memories of Vietnam (II): Surprised to be surrounded by a huge Viet Cong force

• BY THOMAS E. RICKS
• APRIL 15, 2015
• 

By Col. Keith Nightingale, U.S. Army (ret.)
Best Defense guest memoirist

As we went on short final into the LZ, we could see less and less until on the ground, we could see nothing. The strikes had set the grass and dried brush on fire and I couldn’t see 10 feet. Between the helicopters churning dust, the swirling diesel fumes and the burning grass and palms, we were completely isolated. SFC Swyers, Cpt Tot, his RTO’s and myself, took a compass direction and headed off the LZ.

Within a few minutes, it was now about 1630, we found ourselves inside the jungle where it was cool, calm and quiet. With all personnel accounted for, Hiep ordered us all to move out. While there was no plan to use artillery along the way, we had the support of the US 175mm artillery from Xuan Loc if needed. This was the only artillery with sufficient range to reach us as the Cav artillery had not displaced and the 18th Div did not think their 155mm artillery necessary for the operation.

We progressed for better than an hour as single file columns with an estimated two hours to the objective. Along the way, we made few stops. The distance between columns was about 100 meters but we could only rarely see elements of each other through the dense vegetation. At one point, SFC Swyers pointed to the map, indicated a brown contour line and said we were about 300 meters from the objective. Our column was traveling to the East of Major Hiep. At not quite 1700, shots were suddenly fired to my immediate right (East) front. A Ranger and a VC sentry engaged each other. I saw the muzzle flash and immediately returned automatic fire with my M16. My rounds hit the grenade belt the VC was wearing and there was a bright flash. At that point, everyone started moving and shouting.

I immediately called for artillery and in a few minutes the first rounds landed to our front. The 175mm was a very large round and exploded with a much larger blast than any Rangers had previously experienced. Concurrently, we were on the gun-target line, the direct line between the gun and the target and this created a significant problem. The 175mm has very little deviation left or right from the gun line but significant range error -especially at maximum range at which we were. As I could not see the rounds exploding, I had to adjust by sound. I would get some sensings from the Rangers at the point but accuracy was difficult as the refires were slow and we were moving rapidly. Almost at the basecamp, the rounds were impacting both on the VC and very near to lead elements and Tot asked me to cease fire which I did.

At this time, we had an L-19 overhead which could not see us or the basecamp but kept us in constant touch with Xuan Loc. This was a major confidence factor as it was beginning to get dark and under the canopy, it became dark very quickly.

To our West, Hiep had immediately understood what was happening after his lead elements broke into the front of the basecamp. He told me later that he saw he was in a camp much larger than expected and that he sensed we were against at least a battalion rather than a company. He and the lead Rangers could see the several lines of zig zag trenches with low corner bunkers and .51 Cal machine guns and the many VC working around them. How we caught them by surprise I will never understand but I guess the jungle dampens the loudest sounds.

Hiep immediately ordered all Rangers to attack the basecamp. His rationale was that if we did not attack, we would be overrun in the jungle by what was clearly a superior force. Our survival depended on our ability to take advantage of surprise and overrun the basecamp. Within 10 minutes, we occupied two thirds of the basecamp and were entrenched in their own lines when it became dark and we had to consolidate for the night.

Our spotter aircraft circled overhead relaying our situation but it could not see us through the canopy. I began to call 175mm artillery again and registered rounds all around us. My technique, again relying purely on sound sensings, was to bring the rounds in to our positions until the front line screamed “No more. ” (Dung Ban!) At that point, I told the artillery to adjust 100m closer but not fire. It was now pitch dark and eerily silent.

SFC Swyers and I were behind one large banyan tree with wide spreading roots at the ground. Tot and his RTO’s were next to us behind another. The bullets from the 51 caliber’s were cutting all the limbs and trunks above our heads and we kept ourselves flat on the ground or directly behind the thickest part of the tree as the wood shards and leaves rained down with every swing of the gun in our direction (I have since lost a picture I took two days later that shows the tree from the VC side shredded to splinters but with the trunk core still standing.) The original tree had a diameter that must have exceeded 5 feet.

All night, we could hear the sound of bamboo clicking against bamboo around our perimeter. Tot told me that was VC guides marking our positions. There was only occasional firing but we slept very little.

I moved over to Hiep’s position and found his radio operators in a piece of low ground using the old US WW II hand crank radio to send Morse messages to Xuan Loc advising them of our situation. His FM radio was useless talking to Xuan Loc and our pilot was not bilingual. We were told that the 48th was located in the LZ and would “reinforce” us and that the 11th ACR had organized a night assault from the South. We could actually hear elements of the 48th unload from trucks.

Cpt Shine and I, through our airborne radio relay, concentrated on gaining helicopter gunship support and getting night flare missions over our position. Around midnight, a very thick fog settled over us and it became almost impossible to accurately adjust the C47 Spooky flare ship. Like the artillery, all adjustments were by sound or the glow of flares through the fog rather than visual reference point. It became very frustrating to have the C47 unload flares everywhere but over us. I used my pen gun flares from behind the tree but had to stop as it was drawing fire. Above, the Spooky pilot told me he could see nothing but a fog blanket. Cpt Shine and I both tried and eventually the Spooky had to return to Bien Hoa but not before he promised to return at first light with guns.

It was under this fog blanket, we later learned, that the VC boated two and half battalions of infantry from the North side of the Dong Nai into the basecamp at the head of the river oxbow. Thankfully, we did not know this at the time.

Meanwhile, Hiep had asked for the 48th Regiment to join us. While they never said No, they never moved either. It was soon clear that they would not come this night. Soon after midnight, we heard a lot of firing and explosions to the South. We later learned that this was an ambush of the 11th ACR the VC had set at a ford site that effectively prevented their joining us.

I believe the VC had carefully thought out this entire action ahead of time (possibly with the help of the 18th Div CG) and knew the 11th had to cross at that particular site. Quite possibly, this entire action was designed to destroy the 52d BDQ, the only effective RVN force in Long Khanh Province.

The L19 pilots changed out about the same time and informed us we would have helicopter gunship support from the 11th ACR at first light. Concurrently, MACV was assembling tactical air support for us. Just before dawn the VC began strong probing attacks.

It is important to understand the tactical geography we were dealing with. The basecamp was constructed in an oxbow (large loop) at the point where the Dong Nai went North and then abruptly South. On the point of the Southern loop a small creek, the Suoi Long, wound its way into the jungle. The stream had very steep banks and was covered on both sides by bamboo brush with very sharp thorns. This obstacle cut our left flank and much of our rear. My side, the Eastern perimeter, was bound by the edge of the Dong Nai and was the way we had come-in essence, we were at the narrow part of a funnel. While this gave us interior lines, it made us vulnerable to the rear and provided little maneuver room. Our front was the first two trench lines of the basecamp.

Soon, we began to receive showers of grenades and mortars. We could hear the distinct sound of the sandpaper scratching fuse igniters of the small grenades and hear them clunk against the tree trunks and vegetation. Most did not explode but we always winched in anticipation. I counted more than a dozen duds in front of our tree when we returned several days later.

We could hear the mortars being fired to our flank and rear and then clunk and slam themselves through the canopy above. Probably less than half actually exploded as the canopy deflected the rounds. Regardless, enough went off near us to keep our attention. Several went off directly above me but we were protected by the highest large limbs.

As soon as I heard the sound of rounds igniting in the mortar tube, I swung my compass around and provided a direction to the L19 pilot. Almost immediately, he spotted the firing flashes, rolled in with his marking rockets and knocked out the position. However, we couldn’t really tell any difference as the volume of small arms fire began to rapidly pickup.

Soon, it was apparent that we were being pushed from forces on all sides, including some in the rear. Fortunately, these attacks were not well coordinated. We were able to defend against each separate attack. However, after about an hour, now 0630 and first light, we were on the edge of being overrun. At our position to the rear and side of the Ranger front, Swyers and I were engaging infiltrators every few minutes. Our entire position soon became increasingly constricted.

 

[tru_m.a.c]

VOICE
Setting the record straight on the end of the Vietnam War (2): How it really ended

• BY THOMAS E. RICKS
• APRIL 15, 2015
• 

By Arnold R. Isaacs
Best Defense guest historian

Here are some more facts to remember about the final chapters of the Vietnam war and the allegation that South Vietnam’s defeat was solely caused by Congress and the peace movement, not faulty U.S. policies or failures by South Vietnamese leaders:

— While deliberating on the 1974 aid budget, Congress was receiving stunningly inaccurate assessments of South Vietnam’s situation from Nixon administration officials. Henry Kissinger, the most prominent spokesman on Vietnam, repeatedly assured lawmakers that the previous year’s Paris ceasefire agreement had brought “peace with honor” and that major fighting had ended. Other officials were equally upbeat. “We do not put a high probability on an all-out offensive,” Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger declared in June 1974, adding that “the armed forces of South Vietnam are giving an excellent account of themselves when there are flare-ups of hostilities.” Consistent with those messages (and with their flawed representation of the facts), administration reports for many months understated South Vietnam’s post-ceasefire casualties by more than half, an error that was not corrected until well after the aid votes. In fact, the fighting in 1974 was heavier than in almost all previous years of the war, and more South Vietnamese soldiers were killed than in any year except 1972. If Congress underestimated Vietnam’s needs when it voted on the 1974 aid appropriation, the administration’s rosy and wildly inaccurate assessments surely bear some of the blame.

— South Vietnam’s strategy following the Paris agreement made the effects of the 1974 aid reductions much worse than they needed to be. President Nguyen Van Thieu’s policy after the ceasefire was exactly the same as it was at the height of the U.S. war: to maintain his government’s control over every foot of ground its army could occupy. Without U.S. troops and firepower, that goal was far less tenable. But Thieu and his generals never tried to come up with a more realistic strategy. Instead, they continued large-scale offensive operations for many months after the ceasefire (which was also ignored by the Communist side), occupying even more positions of no strategic value and that clearly could not be defended against the next major enemy attack. Many were enclaves that could only be supplied by air, a major drain on South Vietnam’s diminishing resources. In the closing months of 1974, as the tide of battle shifted against the government forces, many of those outlying positions were overrun. With them were lost thousands of men and mountains of ammunition, weapons and supplies that could have been conserved to defend more important areas. Those losses, coming while Thieu and his commanders were vociferously lamenting the shortfall in U.S. aid, were as predictable as they were unnecessary. There is no record, by the way, of any meaningful effort by U.S. officials to encourage a more realistic policy.

— To bring the aid story to its close: in April 1975, with South Vietnam’s army already in its final catastrophic retreat and defeat just a few weeks away, the Ford administration asked Congress for an additional $722 million in aid (expanding an earlier request for $300 million, the amount that had been authorized but not appropriated for the fiscal year). The $722 million request was patently symbolic, since almost no one in the administration or out really thought any of the additional arms or supplies would ever reach Vietnam. Before Congress acted, the war ended. The official who most energetically pushed that eleventh-hour aid proposal inside the administration was Henry Kissinger, author of the failed peace agreement and a man not known for indifference to his public image. It is difficult not to think that one of his motivations was to set the stage for putting the most possible blame on congressional Democrats for the impending defeat, and the least possible on his own actions. If so, judging by how widespread that impression is today, he succeeded beyond his wildest dreams.

 

[tru_m.a.c]

VOICE
Memories of Vietnam: Fighting alongside a well-led unit of Vietnamese Rangers

• BY THOMAS E. RICKS
• APRIL 14, 2015
• 

By Col. Keith Nightingale, U.S. Army (ret.)
Best Defense guest memoirist

When Americans thinks of the Vietnam War, they tend to reflect only what our troops did. The actions and activities of the Vietnamese military itself is largely forgotten which is unfair to the whole. The vast majority of the fighting was performed by Vietnamese troops supported by a large U.S. advisory effort bringing our resources to them. Thousands of U.S. military served as advisors from all Services to all Services. The Vietnamese units ranged from very good to very bad-not unlike our own. When we consider that they had been fighting since 1954, the varying quality and emotional exhaustion is understandable compared to our own.

Many of these units were consistently superb and were to the final end in 1975. The U.S. advisory effort was important to their success, but not the only reason for it. Their efforts, qualities and actions went largely unreported in the media as they were not American units. But, they were our units. This narrative addresses one of those units that both benefited and grew with U.S. military support at an obscure piece of jungle at a small area known as Suoi Long.

The Spring of 1967 in III Corps was a transition year for the VC and NVA. They were on the cusp of moving into conventional warfare from their guerilla roots and had not encountered serious setbacks in the region to this point. That changed for one unit and its advisory elements in June with a single major battle fought between the 52nd Vietnamese Ranger Battalion and a Main Force VC element in excess of two regiments, 23-24 June, along the Dong Nai River.

The Dong Nai River is a large roiling black body that winds its way through what was labeled War Zone D. About 15 kilometers north of Xuan Loc, the provincial capital of Long Kanh and a major throughway to Saigon from the East, the river bisects solid double and triple canopy jungle, previously a sanctuary for the many transiting VC and NVA units as they moved south and west toward the more populated Saigon-Di An-Tay Ninh population centers.

Temporarily assigned to the local ARVN Division, the 18th-rated the worst in the army-was one of the best elements in the army-the 52nd Ranger Battalion already holding a U.S. Presidential Unit Citation for earlier relieving an element of the U.S. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and destined to win a second for their actions on the Dong Nai.

The Battalion Commander was Maj Nguyen Hiep (since killed in a re-education camp) His counterpart was Captain Al Shine, the Senior Advisor. I was assigned to Captain Tot, the Executive Officer and had as my NCO SFC Swyers, a Ranger NCO with considerable Korean War experience. We each had a radio operator-mine was nicknamed “Elephant” due to his huge size-even by U.S. standards. At six feet, three inches myself, “blending into the unit” was not an option despite the best advice of the Saigon in-country instruction.

The role of an advisor in such as unit as the Rangers was pretty clear. Our task was to coordinate all the U.S. assets available to bring them to bear on behalf of the Rangers. U.S. artillery, aerial gunships and lift helicopters, tactical air, naval gunfire and maneuver units as well as medevac were the daily advisor tasks. Very little was expected in the way in advice as our counterparts were far more experienced and combat competent than we were.

The 52nd was organized along standard U.S. Army lines with four rifle companies and a Headquarters Company. Each rifle company had approximately 80-90 personnel. The total battalion strength on the LZ the day of this action was approximately 450. The primary armaments were the antiquated M1 carbine, BAR, .30 Cal M1919 Light MG and M79 grenade launcher. The soldiers were primarily the social outcasts of Vietnamese society. The officers were predominately ethnic North Vietnamese who had fled south at the demarcation in 1954. All would be described as fatalists who fully expected to die fighting the communists and had no expectations of living out the war. Through continuous experience, they were exceptionally proficient disciplined combat soldiers. In garrison, they were usually less than quality citizens. They had no use for their government or their very senior National leadership. They lived to kill and expected to be killed.

The VC force encountered was a “Main Force” element at full strength primarily populated with new soldiers and new equipment. Post operation sweeps showed that most corpses were teenagers with new uniforms, fresh haircuts, equipment and weapons. Most VC were armed with AK 47’s with new canvas magazine carriers and stick grenade belts. Additional weapons were .51 cal Heavy Machine Guns, RPG’s, RPK squad automatic weapons and 82mm mortars. These forces thoroughly outgunned their ARVN adversaries.

I had joined the 52d BDQ at Xuan Loc basecamp, or Ranger Hill as it was known by us, in April of 1967 as a 1st Lt, Deputy Senior Advisor. From the perspective of the occupants of the MAVC compound, it might as well have been Siberia. They were primarily responsible for the 18th ARVN Division and the Province forces and we had few cordial relations or mutual interests. The feeling was mutual between the Rangers and their Vietnamese counterparts in Xuan Loc. Both elements had a decidedly hostile attitude toward each other. The Rangers had no regard for the 18th based on past poor performance and clear non-interest in field operations. The Commanding General viewed the attachment of the 52nd as a gift to hide his own unit’s lack of operations and kept the 52d in the field as often as possible.

Two weeks prior to joining the battalion, the 52nd had successfully broken a major VC ambush of the 11th ACR along Highway QL 20, North and West of Xuan Loc. From then on, the 11th ACR habitually asked for the Rangers which became their light infantry. This was a great relationship because the Rangers knew in their hearts if they got in trouble, the Cav would always move mountains to get to them and would provide the artillery and air support that could be expected had they been American troops. This provided a huge boost of confidence and was a major cause for the very aggressive combat actions of the battalion. This feeling was a crucial part of the Ranger psyche as the battle unfolded.

On a field operation in mid-May, the Rangers were laagered in an area known as the Chinese Farms when a Cav helicopter landed. It was Col Cobb, the 11th ACR Regimental Commander, who presented Maj Hiep and our senior advisor, Captain Al Shine, with two brand new M60 machine guns, the only ones the Rangers had. Hiep gave them to the best machine gunners in the battalion-two Montagnards with gold front teeth, both of which smoked a small pipe. I shall never forget the image over my right shoulder of one of those gunners at Suoi Long calmly working off 3 round bursts with the pipe in his mouth as if he were at a Ft Benning gunnery range. The gunner keyed on the sound of the VC commanders blowing whistles and on more than one occasion I heard the whistle abruptly ingested as the M60 rounds impacted. These two guns plus the very few M16’s in the battalion were to have a decisive early effect at Suoi Long. (Hiep and Tot’s bodyguards and myself as well as some other soldiers had M16’s. Months after the battle, we were told that at the initial contact, the VC commander believed we were a new regiment as he hadn’t heard Vietnamese with M16’s before-reportedly this caused him to be more cautious with us than he otherwise might have been). But that was later.

On the 22d of June, the 52d BDQ was on rest at Ranger Hill after almost a month in the field. Normally, we could expect one or two week’s rest before going back to the field. However, on this day, three days after stand down, Cpt Shine was called to MAVC compound and briefed on an immediate operation for the 52d. The 18th Div CG, who exercised tactical control of the 52d, told Hiep that a VC “deserter” had told the Intelligence Officer (G2-Phong Nhi), that he had been part of a construction unit that was building a company size basecamp along the Dong Nai River to receive a new VC unit. Hiep’s mission was to take the deserter the next day, the 23d, find the basecamp and destroy it. We would conduct an air assault with U.S. helicopters and be reinforced by the 11th ACR and possibly the 48th Regiment of the 18th. However, we were told that probably no reinforcements would be needed.

The concept, discussed with the advisors and unit subordinates was that the Battalion, once inserted, would form into two columns for movement in the jungle. One half of the battalion and the deserter would move with Hiep and the other with myself and Captain Tot. Both elements would move parallel about 100 meters apart. Cpt Shine and “Elephant,” the US RTO, would move with Hiep, I and SFC Swyers, would move with the XO, Cpt Tot. The knowledge that SFC Swyers was Korean War veteran gave me a needed shot of confidence, as this was my first real combat operation. During the action, Swyers was very cool and his experience came through helping hold the Rangers together and organizing our constantly changing defense.

We were trucked to the pickup zone, which was very hot and exposed. Accompanying us was the 52nd Vietnamese Reconnaissance Company-no organizational elation. They were armed with M1 Garand rifles. The Rangers assembled the following morning in the edge of Don Dien Michelin rubber plantation and waited for the helicopters. Eventually, around 1500, they began to arrive in mass. Soon, more than 40 UHIH’s arrived from all over III Corps, including the Kiwi’s from the New Zealand unit at Nui Dat. I had never seen so many lift ships before. By 1600, we were loaded on the helicopters waiting for the air strikes and artillery. Sitting on the birds, we were in the direct sunlight, the heat was stifling and the rotor blades were churning dust and diesel fuel over us. We were all exhausted, physically and mentally, by the time the birds lifted off.

The fresh air was a relief once aloft and we could see immediately where we were going. Artillery was exploding in the small clearing in the middle of a dense jungle expanse that went to the horizon as far as one could see with the just the dark slash of the Dong Nai slightly to the north to break the solid green. Tactical air strikes were underway and helicopter gunships could be seen hanging on the periphery ducking in an out between strikes to make gun runs. The Dong Nai River, Nui Ba Den Mountain and the vast expanse of War Zone D created the vision of a giant IMAX movie screen. The adrenalin kicked in.