Question: Bush’s attack on Iraq was based on lies and violated international law. Why has there not been any discussion about war crimes, and why aren’t people talking about impeachment?
Noam Chomsky: They are. In fact, various lawyers’ groups–to some extent in the U.S. but mostly in England and Canada and elsewhere–are bringing demands for a war crimes trial for the crime of aggression. However, though the invasion of Iraq was plainly an act of aggression, it doesn’t break any records.
What was the invasion of South Vietnam, for example, in 1962, when Kennedy sent the Air Force to bomb South Vietnam and start chemical warfare? That’s aggression.
Or what was the Indonesian invasion of East Timor?
What was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which ended up killing 20,000 people?
These last two were carried out thanks to decisive U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic support. And the list goes on.
The invasion of Panama, what was that? The U.S. killed, according to the Panamanians, 3,000 civilians. Maybe they’re right. We don’t investigate our own crimes, so nobody knows. But it certainly killed plenty of people–on the scale of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, roughly the same casualties. The U.S. used its veto power on the Security Council and voted against the condemnation in the General Assembly. Manuel Noriega was illegally brought back to Florida, tried in a ridiculous trial in which he was convicted of crimes which he had indeed committed, almost all of them when he was on the CIA payroll. It was just like the trial of Saddam Hussein will be, if he ever comes to trial: He will be convicted of crimes that the U.S. supported, but that part won’t be mentioned.
The case of Iraq was a bit unusual, for a lot of reasons–for one, because it was over such overwhelming international opposition. I don’t think there has ever been a case where global opinion was so overwhelmingly against an action.
How does the international law community deal with this? That’s quite interesting. In fact, if you have the time, I would suggest reading professional journals like The American Journal of International Law. When something like this takes place, the international law professionals have a complicated task. There is a fringe that just tells the truth: Look, it’s a violation of international law. But most have to construct complex arguments to justify it as defense counsel. That’s basically their job, defense counsel for state power.
They say that the Security Council doesn’t have the military force to carry out the will of the community of nations, so therefore it implicitly delegates this to states that do have the force, meaning the United States. And therefore, the U.S., by invading Iraq, under a communitarian interpretation of the Charter, was in actuality fulfilling the will of the international community. It’s irrelevant that 90 percent of the world’s population and almost all states bitterly condemned it.
This is a large part of the academic profession: to make up complex, subtle arguments that are childishly ridiculous but are enveloped in sufficient profundity that they take on a kind of plausibility. The basic principle is that the losers have to confess, not the victors. When they do it, it’s a crime. When we do it, it’s not. And more generally, it’s the defeated who are tried, not the victors. Every one of these trials, almost without exception, is victors’ justice. Sometimes they’re legitimate, but that’s kind of incidental.
Q: What is the Bush imperial strategy?
Chomsky: It has two components. One is that we declare that we have the right to carry out offensive military actions against countries we regard as a security threat because they have weapons of mass destruction. (insert "terrorist" target instead

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Many criticized it, not so much because they disagreed but because they thought the brazenness was ultimately a threat to the United States and therefore shouldn’t be done that way. Even Madeleine Albright, in an article in Foreign Affairs, pointed out, quite accurately, that this is not the kind of thing you do. Of course, every President has that doctrine, but you don’t advertise it. You keep it in your pocket, and you use it when you want to. So this is just kind of stupid and dangerous.
The most interesting comment, perhaps, was Kissinger’s. He described it as a revolutionary new doctrine in international affairs which, of course, tears up the whole Westphalian system from the early seventeenth century. It’s a good doctrine, he said, but added that we have to understand that it is not in the national interest for this doctrine to be universalized. That’s a nice way of saying the doctrine is for us, not for anyone else. We will use force whenever we like against anyone we regard as a potential threat, and maybe we will delegate that right to clients, but it’s not for others.
Q: And the other part?
Chomsky: It says states that harbor terrorists are as guilty as the terrorists themselves and will be treated as such.
How does that one work? What are the states that harbor terrorists? Let’s put aside harboring leaders of states who are terrorists. If we count that, it reduces to absurdity in no time. So let’s talk about the kind of terrorists whom they regard as terrorists, what I call subnational terrorists, like those in Al Qaeda and Hamas. What states harbor them?
Just to give a little background, the U.S. launched a terrorist war against Cuba in 1959. It picked up rapidly under Kennedy, with Operation Mongoose–a major escalation that actually came close to leading to nuclear war. And all through the 1970s, terrorist actions against Cuba were being carried out from U.S. territory, in violation of U.S. law and, of course, international law. The U.S. was harboring the terrorists, and quite serious ones.
There is Orlando Bosch, for example, whom the FBI accuses of thirty serious terrorist acts, including participation in the destruction of the Cubana airliner in which seventy-three people were killed back in 1976. The Justice Department wanted him deported. It said he’s a threat to the security of the United States. George Bush I, at the request of his son Jeb, gave Bosch a Presidential pardon. He’s sitting happily in Miami, and we’re harboring a person whom the Justice Department regards as a dangerous terrorist, a threat to the security of the U.S.
Here’s another example: The Venezuelan government is now asking for extradition of two military officers who were accused of participation in bombing attacks in Caracas and then just fled the country. These military officers participated in a coup, which, for a couple of days, overthrew the government. The U.S. openly supported the coup, and, according to British journalists, was involved in instigating it. The officers are now pleading for political asylum in the U.S.
Or take, say, Emmanuel Constant, whose death squads killed maybe 4,000 or 5,000 Haitians [during the early 1990s while he was on the payroll of the CIA]. Today, he is living happily in Queens because the U.S. refused to even respond to requests from Aristide for extradition.
So who is harboring terrorists? If the most important revolutionary part of the Bush Doctrine is that states that harbor terrorists are terrorist states, what do we conclude from that? We conclude exactly what Kissinger was kind enough to say: These doctrines are unilateral. They are not intended as doctrines of international law or doctrines of international affairs. They are doctrines that grant the U.S. the right to use force and violence and to harbor terrorists, but not anyone else.