No thread on Syria's chemical/gas attack massacre...

[the next guy]

i dont get why the u.s., israel, russia has chemical weapons but syria had to get rid of theirs. this is a set up. everyone has chemical weapons and everyone uses them.

Same reason why people tell blacks to get over slavery.
Cacs going to cac

 

[2Quik4UHoes]

lol, 'murrica is a funny ass place sometimes....

 

[Kritic]

In this speech JFK refers to the secret societies which have infiltrated the United States




i see you aipac.

 

[Shogun]

i dont get why the u.s., israel, russia has chemical weapons but syria had to get rid of theirs. this is a set up. everyone has chemical weapons and everyone uses them.

Because we're the bullies.....bullies make the rules. Thats how the world works. Your mom didn't teach you that life isnt fair?

 

[Ritzy Sharon]

Domenico Quirico: My 150-day ordeal as a hostage of Syria's rebels

The Italian journalist was taken prisoner by an anti-Assad revolutionary brigade. The horror that followed led him to rename the country 'the land of evil'


The night was as sweet as wine: I had come, on 8 April, to al-Qusayr, 22 miles south of Homs, to report on another chapter of the Syrian war. Instead, 152 days of imprisonment followed, in small dark rooms where I battled against time and fear and endless humiliations; against hunger and against the absence of pity. Where I endured two mock executions and the silence of God, my family and the outside world.

I was a hostage in Syria, betrayed by a revolution that had lost its way and become the property of fanatics and bandits. In this place, when the hostage weeps, everyone laughs at the spectacle of his pain and sees it as a sign of weakness. Syria has become the Country of Evil, the land where evil triumphs and thrives like grapes on the vine under a Middle Eastern sun, and where evil displays all its aspects: greed, hatred, fanaticism, the absence of mercy; where even children and the old rejoice in their malevolence. My captors prayed to their God standing next to me, the suffering prisoner. They prayed content, without remorse and attentive to their rituals. What were they saying to their God?

We had arrived at al-Qusayr in a convoy bringing supplies from the Free Syrian Army, after a long night driving without lights through the mountains because the roads were controlled by the regime. The city had already been devastated and half-destroyed by air bombardment and we decided to go back to where we had come from to try to get to Damascus.

On leaving the city, we were stopped by two pick-up trucks full of masked men. They made us get out, took us to a house and beat us up, claiming to be police officers working for the regime. In the following days [I and a fellow hostage, Belgian teacher Pierre Piccinin da Prata] discovered that they were fervent Islamists who prayed five times a day to their God in solemn tones. On the Friday, they listened to the sermon of a preacher urging jihad against Bashar al-Assad. The decisive proof came when we were bombarded from the air. It was clear we were being held by rebel forces.

The leader of the group holding us was a self-appointed "emir" who liked to be addressed as Abu Omar, a nickname. He had formed his brigade by taking people from the area, mostly bandits rather than Islamists or revolutionaries. Abu Omar gave an Islamic gloss to the criminal activities of his band and had links with al-Farouk, the group that then took control of us. Al-Farouk is a well-known brigade in the Syrian revolution, part of the Syrian National Council, and its representatives have held meetings with European governments. The west trusts them, but I learned to my cost that we are talking about a new and disturbing phenomenon in the revolt: the emergence of groups of Somali-style bandits who use an Islamic veneer and the context of the revolution to control pieces of territory, extort money from the population, kidnap people and generally fill their boots.

To begin with, we were held in a house in the suburbs of al-Qusayr. The district was bombed and we were moved to another house. When the same thing happened again, we were handed over for a week to the Syrian al-Qaida, Jabhat al-Nusra. This was the only time we were to be treated like human beings and even, in some ways, kindly. For example, they gave us the same food as they ate themselves. Al-Qaida fighters at war live an ascetic existence. They are fanatics who hope to construct an Islamic state in Syria and then throughout the Middle East. But towards their enemies – and being white, Christian and western, we were their enemies – they have a sense of honour and respect. Al-Nusra is on the list of terrorist organisations compiled by America, but they were the only ones who showed us any respect. Then we were handed back to Abu Omar …

One day Abu Omar was sitting like a lord under a tree, surrounded by his little court of fighters. He called me because he wanted me to sit down by his side. He wanted to pretend to be our friend to deceive some others in the area who were wondering who these westerners were, so badly dressed and physically wasted after two months of prison. I asked him for his phone, telling him that my loved ones almost certainly thought I was dead and that he was destroying my life and my family. He laughed, and said there was no signal in the area. It wasn't true. A soldier from the Free Syrian army gave me a phone in front of Abu Omar. It was the only act of mercy towards me in the 152 days. No one else demonstrated what we would call pity, mercy or compassion. Even the children and old people tried to hurt us. In Syria I encountered the land of evil. I managed to talk to home for just 20 seconds. After the desperate cry I heard on the other end of the line, it went dead.

They kept us like animals, lying on straw mattresses in tiny rooms with closed windows, notwithstanding the terrible heat. They gave us their leftovers to eat. I'd never experienced the daily humiliations relating to simple things like not being able to go to the toilet, or having to ask for everything and always hearing the answer "no". I think there was a deep satisfaction for them in seeing the rich westerner reduced to the status of a beggar.

The first time we tried to escape, our guard had probably fallen asleep. We left the house and headed to what we thought were the lights of al-Qusayr. After 200 metres we were caught. The second time we were in another area, during the final phase of our detention. Our captors were often careless about looking after their stuff. We got our hands on two grenades and hid them in a sofa. One night they failed to lock the door. We left and tried to make it to the Syrian-Turkish border at Bab al-Hawa after stopping a car using Kalashnikovs also taken from the house. But there was a checkpoint. We were taken back to our captors to face our punishment.

They shut us in a storage room with our hands tied behind our backs and kept us there for three days. Our value to them was as merchandise. Merchandise cannot be destroyed without losing the proper price for it. You feel like a sack of grain, something that has value only to the extent it can be sold. They can kick you but they can't kill you, because if they finish you off they can't sell you.

Twice they put me up against the wall. We were near al-Qusayr. One of them approached with a pistol. He showed me that it was loaded and then told me to put my head against the wall. He put the pistol against my temple. Long moments followed. You become ashamed of yourself. You hear the breath of the man next to you, who exudes the pleasure of having another man completely in his power. He knows you are afraid. So you become angry about being afraid. It's similar to when children, who can be terribly cruel, pull the tail off a lizard or the legs from a fly. The same terrible ferocity.

For a laugh, our captors would tell us every now and then: "It'll be two or three days, or a week, and then you'll be free in Italy." It was just to see our desperation when they added the word "Inshallah" (God willing). It was their way of lying without seeming to lie. They continually said "bukrah" (tomorrow), and then the next day nobody went anywhere. Finally, I sensed the moment had really come. This time there was no "Inshallah". They made us get out of the cars on the other side of the border, telling us to walk. I thought they might shoot us in the back. It was dark, it was a Sunday night, after sunset. I thought to myself that if I heard the sound of guns preparing to fire I would throw myself on the ground. I was sure they were going to eliminate us. I had seen their faces, I knew their names. But no one used their Kalashnikov. Inshallah, this was the moment of our liberation.

This is an edited extract of an original article that appeared in La Stampa

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/15/domenico-quirico-my-hostage-ordeal

 

[Kritic]

Al-Nusra is on the list of terrorist organisations compiled by America, but they were the only ones who showed us any respect. Then we were handed back to Abu Omar …
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/15/domenico-quirico-my-hostage-ordeal

 

[thekingsmen]

learn to read

Still nothing.....waiting on the proof.

 

[Kritic]

Because we're the bullies.....bullies make the rules. Thats how the world works. Your mom didn't teach you that life isnt fair?

the thing that worries me about your statement is the "we " part. there is no we. this war is started by individuals who will profit from it. and use me and you to fight in the war in the name of patriotism.
sure a few low level pawns will gain out of it too but the guys making real money off these wars make the real killing leaving behind a problems which me and you have to live with.

 

[Shogun]

the thing that worries me about your statement is the "we " part. there is no we. this war is started by individuals who will profit from it. and use me and you to fight in the war in the name of patriotism.
sure a few low level pawns will gain out of it too but the guys making real money off these wars make the real killing leaving behind a problems which me and you have to live with.

Fair point.

 

[Resident Geordie]

Syria: nearly half rebel fighters are jihadists or hardline Islamists, says IHS Jane's report
Nearly half the rebel fighters in Syria are now aligned to jihadist or hardline Islamist groups according to a new analysis of factions in the country's civil war.

Opposition forces battling Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria now number around 100,000 fighters, but after more than two years of fighting they are fragmented into as many as 1,000 bands.

The new study by IHS Jane's, a defence consultancy, estimates there are around 10,000 jihadists - who would include foreign fighters - fighting for powerful factions linked to al-Qaeda..

Another 30,000 to 35,000 are hardline Islamists who share much of the outlook of the jihadists, but are focused purely on the Syrian war rather than a wider international struggle.

There are also at least a further 30,000 moderates belonging to groups that have an Islamic character, meaning only a small minority of the rebels are linked to secular or purely nationalist groups.

The stark assessment, to be published later this week, accords with the view of Western diplomats estimate that less than one third of the opposition forces are "palatable" to Britain, while American envoys put the figure even lower.

Fears that the rebellion against the Assad regime is being increasingly dominated by extremists has fuelled concerns in the West over supplying weaponry that will fall into hostile hands. These fears contributed to unease in the US and elsewhere over military intervention in Syria.

Charles Lister, author of the analysis, said: "The insurgency is now dominated by groups which have at least an Islamist viewpoint on the conflict. The idea that it is mostly secular groups leading the opposition is just not borne out."

The study is based on intelligence estimates and interviews with activists and militants. The lengthy fighting has seen the emergence of hundreds of separate rebel bands, each operating in small pockets of the country, which are usually loyal to larger factions.

Two factions linked to al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) - also know as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS) - have come to dominate among the more extremist fighters, Mr Lister said. Their influence has risen significantly in the past year.

"Because of the Islamist make up of such a large proportion of the opposition, the fear is that if the West doesn't play its cards right, it will end up pushing these people away from the people we are backing," he said. "If the West looks as though it is not interested in removing Assad, moderate Islamists are also likely to be pushed further towards extremists."

Though still a minority in number, ISIL has become more prominent in rebel-held parts of Syria in recent months. Members in northern Syria have sought to assert their dominance over the local population and over the more moderate rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA).

The aim of moderate rebel fighters is the overthrow of their country's authoritarian dictator, but jihadist groups want to transform Syria into a hard-line Islamic state within a regional Islamic "caliphate".

These competing visions have caused rancour which last week erupted into fighting between ISIL and two of the larger moderate rebel factions.

A statement posted online by Islamists announced the launch of an ISIL military offensive in the eastern district of Aleppo which it called "Cleansing Evil". "We will target regime collaborators, shabiha [pro-Assad militias], and those who blatantly attacked the Islamic state," it added, naming the Farouq and Nasr factions.

Al-Qaeda has assassinated several FSA rebel commanders in northern Latakia province in recent weeks, and locals say they fear this is part of a jihadist campaign to gain complete control of the territory.

As well as being better armed and tougher fighters, ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra have taken control of much of the income-generating resources in the north of the country, including oil, gas and grain.

This has given them significant economic clout, allowing them to "win hearts and minds" by providing food for the local population in a way that other rebel groups cannot.

ISIS has also begun a programme of "indoctrination" of civilians in rebel-held areas, trying to educate Syria's traditionally moderate Sunni Muslims into a more hard-line interpretation of Islam.

In early September, the group distributed black backpacks with the words "Islamic State of Iraq" stamped on them. They also now control schools in Aleppo where young boys are reportedly taught to sing jihadist anthems.

"It seems it is some sort of a long-term plan to brainwash the children and recruit potential fighters," said Elie Wehbe, a Lebanese journalists who is conducting research into these activities.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wor...hardline-Islamists-says-IHS-Janes-report.html

I think this is bollocks, I've yet to see one secular battalion linked to the Syrian opposition, and welcome any evidence to say otherwise

 

[thekingsmen]

The so called 100,000 are easy to break down...sadly 95% or more aren't even Syrian.

 

[Constantine]

I wanted to add a little background on Syria concerning the Ikhwan/Syrian Muslim Brotherhood since the topic was brought up. This post isn’t an attempt to absolve Hafiz Asad for any of his past transgressions, and it’s only meant to provide some balance to the conflict: after the end of WWI, France colonized Syria. France faced an insurgency by a majority Sunni opposition, with the Ikhwan leading the vanguard. The French recruited from the Alawi community, and the insurgency was eventually put down. The Sunni community, especially the Ikhwan never forgave the Alawis for their collaboration with the colonial authorities, and their anger, and resentment exacerbated the sectarian tensions between the Ikhwan, and those they deemed as the “heretical” Alawis.

The Ikhwan/Syrian Muslim Brotherhood are ideological offshoots of Salafism/Wahhabism. Wahabists believe in a very austere, medieval form of Islam; the Taliban are their scion. Wahabists don’t believe in separation between Church and state, and believe Sharia should be the sole source of jurisprudence. This became a major source of contention between secular run Arab regimes such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria in the post colonial era. It was problematic for religious minorities as well. It’s why the Copts in Egypt were concerned with the Muslim Brotherhood taking power, and why 50 years ago Christians in Syria, and other religious minorities were leery of the Ikhwan. The Ikhwan in Syria at one point was a political party that worked within the political system, but refused to renounce armed struggle against the government.

http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB47.pdf

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/...yria-MuslimBrotherhoodPressureIntensifies.pdf
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/...yria-MuslimBrotherhoodPressureIntensifies.pdf
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front...ndercover/the-troubled-history-of-hama-syria/
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front...ndercover/the-troubled-history-of-hama-syria/

“During the period between the departure of the French in 1946 and the Ba’th coup in March 1963, the Ikhwan was a legitimate part of the political system, increasing its representation in Parliament from three seats (amounting to 2.6 percent) in 1949 to ten (5.7 percent) in 1961.6 The Ikhwan’s second leader, ’Isam al-‘Attar (b. 1927 in Damascus), rejected the use of violence against the Ba’th throughout the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. By contrast, other senior leaders as well as young activists saw armed struggle as a necessary strategy in the battle against the Ba’th. One example was an important faction in Aleppo headed by ‘Abd al-Fatah abu-Ghuda (b. 1917 in Aleppo, d. 1997).7 Abu-Ghuda supported a policy coupling civil disobedience with armed struggle. The Ikhwan and the Aleppo faction also disagreed about the role of religion in politics. Abu-Ghuda envisioned an entirely Islamic state and government, while al-‘Attar supported a civil government with Islamic representation. Meanwhile, an even more radical third faction took root under the leadership of Marwan Hadid (b. 1934 in Hamah, d. 1976 in jail in Syria), who also supported the use of violence.8”

“Beginning in the 1960s, a new generation of activists took hold of the movement. Many of these activists had studied in Egypt and were influenced by the radical teachings of Sayyid Qutb, who defined governments that failed to implement Sharia in all aspects of life as heretical and illegitimate. These young activists adopted Qutb’s prescription that Arab society must be reformed along the lines of a pure Islam. They accused the Syrian regime of tyranny, corruption, and heresy, regarding it as “an enemy of Islam.” The young activists called for a violent clash with the Ba’th regime in an attempt to topple it.”

The Ikhwan began a campaign of terrorism in their efforts to topple Hafiz Asad, and justified it in part, if not mostly due to his Alawi faith, which was viewed by the Ikhwan as apostasy, and the secular policies of the Ba’th party.

“After taking power in November 1970, Hafiz al-Asad attempted to scale down the anti-Islamic policies characteristic of his predecessors. The attempt was motivated by Asad’s desire to secure religious legitimacy for the ‘Alawi (‘Alawiyyah) community and for his regime. The Ikhwan reciprocated by scaling back its resistance to the regime. Yet the confrontation continued, reaching one of its climaxes with the eruption of riots in 1973 in reaction to Asad’s plans to eliminate the clause in the Syrian constitution stating that Islam is the religion of the president and the source of all jurisprudence.12 As far as the Ikhwan was concerned, this was proof that Asad was not a proper Muslim.”

“In 1979 the Ikhwan escalated its violent activity, and also published for the first time its formal organ, al-Nadhir (The one who warns). On June 16 the Ikhwan launched an attack on the Military Academy for Artillery Officers in Aleppo, causing the death of thirty-two ‘Alawi cadets and injury to dozens more.”

“The year 1980 was a tumultuous year for Syria. At the beginning of that year, it seemed that the regime was on the defensive and that its days were numbered.15 The Ikhwan succeeded in winning popular support among the Sunni population, and even managed to take partial control over all the major cities. Its leaders called for the assassination of government officials and senior military officers—and on June 26 it launched a failed attempt to assassinate Asad.”

“In the August 1980 issue of al-Nadhir, the Syrian Ikhwan leader Abu al-Nasr al-Bayanuni (b. 1945 in Allepo, no relation to ‘Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni, the Ikhwan leader until 2010) spoke of “entering into a necessary campaign to separate heresy from faith.” He also spoke of a jihad conducted by “holy warriors” against the heretical regime, and the need to use arms in order to topple it.19”

“…the Ikhwan established in October 1980 the “Islamic Front” under the leadership of Abu al-Nasr al-Bayanuni. In January of 1981, this organization released a manifesto that stressed the clear division between the believers (that is, the Islamist factions) and the heretics (that is, the regime); highlighted the sectarian nature of the regime; and called for its toppling….in November 1980, a manifesto entitled “The Islamic Revolution in Syria and Its Charter” was published, carrying the signatures of some of the Ikhwan’s top leaders, such as Sa‘id Hawa (b. 1935 in Hamah, d. 1989), ‘Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni, and ‘Adnan Sa‘d al-Din (b. 1929 in Hamah, d. August 2010). This sixty-five-page document adopted the Ikhwan narrative with regard to the regime, and called for an armed revolt in order to topple it.20…It was based on the principles that Islam should be the state religion and that the Sharia must be the basis for state law. In a pamphlet released in 1984, the Front also explicitly called for “killing Asad.”22”

“According to the Ikhwan’s narrative, the regime rests on a narrow sectarian basis and acts on behalf of an external conspiracy to destroy Syria from within by instigating a civil war (fitnah) and by oppressing “true” Muslims.33 In Ikhwan publications, Asad’s sect, the ‘Alawi community (al-taifa al-nusayriyyah), is the target of attacks meant to undermine the regime’s legitimacy. The ‘Alawi sect, according to the Brotherhood, is unanimously believed by Muslims to be guilty of heresy,34 and Asad’s regime “rips apart the unity of the people, and threatens the unity of the homeland.”35”

“In order to legitimize its religious claims against the ‘Alawi regime, the Ikhwan relies on established religious scholars, including Abu Hamed al-Ghazali (1058–1111) and Ibn Taymiyya (1273–1328). The latter decreed that the ‘Alawis are a sect of heretics that must be killed unless they repent and re-embrace Islam.39”

Concerning Hamma, it was a stronghold of Ikhwan opposition to the regime. It’s not clear how many regime officials, and Syrian military personnel the Ikhwan killed. Asad may have understated the number of his forces killed, so as not to make his regime look weak, which would embolden the opposition. However, if he exaggerated the number of his forces killed to make the Ikhwan appear as indiscriminate terrorists, he would run the risk of making the opposition appear as a credible challenge to the regimes authority, which would lead to greater support from the Sunni populace, which wouldn’t be in Asad’s best interest.

“By 1981, however, other Ikhwan activists had taken up arms against the regime. By the end of that year, the city of Hamah had become the center of the armed struggle, with violent clashes occurring almost every day. This reached a climax in February 1982, when the regime’s ensuing crackdown on the movement’s strongholds in the city resulted in thousands of casualties among Ikhwan activists and the movement’s virtual defeat…”

After the assault on Hamma, terrorist activity by the Ikhwan dropped to nearly nil. Conservative estimates put the death toll from a few thousand, to ten thousand. A declassified Defense Intelligence Agency white paper from May, 1982, page 12 states that there were 2,000 casualties

 

[Kritic]

Fair point.

http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/us/dc-navy-yard-gunshots/
Aaron Alexis, 34, a military contractor from Texas.

at least 12 people were killed and about 12 others were injured

 

[Shogun]

http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/us/dc-navy-yard-gunshots/
Aaron Alexis, 34, a military contractor from Texas.

at least 12 people were killed and about 12 others were injured

not sure why you quote me

 

[Kritic]

not sure why you quote me

them n1ggaz ballin. me and you gotta walk around all noid now...