This is getting ridiculous. Let’s break down your inane conspiracy theory arguments step by step.
1. Truman used the bombs to scare the Soviets
False. There is no historical evidence, written, oral or otherwise showing this influenced Truman’s decision to use the bombs. In fact Truman informed the Soviets of a wonder weapon at the Yalta conference.
Wrong.
Read
The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic-Energy Policy and Diplomacy, 1941-1945
"Recognizing that a monopoly of the atomic bomb gave the United States a powerful new military advantage, Roosevelt and Stimson became increasingly anxious to convert it to diplomatic advantage. In December 1944 they spoke of using the "secret" of the atomic bomb as a means of obtaining a quid pro quo from the Soviet Union....Stimson noted several months later in his diary; "Success is 99% assured, yet only by the first actual war trial of this weapon can the actual certainty be fixed."
"What can be said with certainty is that Truman, Stimson, Byrnes, and several others involved in the decision consciously considered two effects of a combat demonstration of the bomb's power: first, the impact of the atomic attack on Japan's leaders...and second, the impact of that attack on the Soviet Union's leaders, who might then prove to be more cooperative."
"When news of the successful atomic test of July 16 reached the president at the Potsdam Conference, he was visibly elated. Stimson noted that Truman 'was tremendously pepped up by it.' The day after receiving the complete report of the test Truman altered his negotiating style. According to Churchill the president 'got ot the meeting after having read this report and he was a changed man. He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting."
"In less than three weeks the new weapon's destructive potential would be demonstrated to the world. Stalin would then be forced to reconsider his diplomatic goals."
Your counterargument was that Truman told Stalin about the bomb at Yalta. You clearly didn't think that through at all - Truman told Stalin about the bomb for the SAME reason he wanted a demonstration - because he was trying to establish dominance over the Soviets.
2. Truman deviously waited till the Soviets invaded Manchuria to drop the bombs.
WTF are you talking about? I never said anything like that. It doesn't even make sense. This is the 5th or 6th time your reading comprehension has failed you.
Truman WAS TOLD when the bombs were going to be dropped. At no point did Truman take initiative nor order the droppings of the bombs on a specific date himself.
Oh look, you're either lying or ignorant yet again.
"A directive (right), written by Leslie Groves, approved by President Truman, and issued by Secretary of War Henry Stimson and General of the Army George Marshall, ordered the Army Air Force's 509th Composite Group to attack Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, or Nagasaki (in that order of preference) as soon after August 3 as weather permitted."
3. The US deliberately made its conditions for peace unclear in order to prolong the war so the Atomic bombs to be tested
6. The Japanese were willing to negotiate their surrender if they just got to keep the emperor which is the same terms they got in 1945.
There are NUMEROUS members of the administration who explicitly said that if we had clarified conditions more effectively, the war could have ended earlier. Every single one of these people knows more than you do about it.
"In the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such a categorical statement about the [retention of the] dynasty had been issued in May, 1945, the surrender-minded elements in the [Japanese] Government might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clearcut decision." -
Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan
"What prevented them from suing for peace or from bringing their plot into the open was their uncertainty on two scores. First, they wanted to know the meaning of unconditional surrender and the fate we planned for Japan after defeat. Second, they tried to obtain from us assurances that the Emperor could remain on the throne after surrender. The Potsdam Declaration, in short, wrecked everything we had been working for to prevent further bloodshed." -
Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence Ellis Zacharias
"I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favorable consideration. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented. I believe we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender, completely satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs." -
Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy
"When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor." - Norman Cousins, consultant to
General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Southwest Pacific Area
"[When he heard] 'the Potsdam declaration in July, demand that Japan surrender unconditionally or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary." - William Manchester, MacArthur's biographer, describing the reaction of
General Douglas MacArthur to the Potsdam declaration
"I am convinced that if you, as President, will make a shortwave broadcast to the people of Japan - tell them they can have their Emperor if they surrender, that it will not mean unconditional surrender except for the militarists - you'll get a peace in Japan - you'll have both wars over." - former president
Herbert Hoover
"The Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945 up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; if such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the [atomic] bombs." - former president
Herbert Hoover
“First, intelligence and other advice to President Truman, in significant part based on intercepted and secretly decoded Japanese cable traffic, indicated that from at least May 1945 on, Japan wished to end the war and seemed likely to do so if assurances were given that the emperor would not be eliminated. Second, similar advice to the president suggested that the shock of Soviet entry into the war (expected in early August) would likely tip the balance, almost certainly if combined with assurances concerning the emperor. Third, Truman was advised by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, Admiral Leahy, the acting Secretary of State Joseph E. Grew, and others to let Japan know that the emperor would not be eliminated; contrary to the claims of some historians, Truman made clear that he had no serious objection to offering such assurances.” -
Historians Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird
It's wild how you keep getting basic facts blatantly wrong, keep misrepresenting the arguments against you, and keep showing total ignorance of what the actual military leaders, intelligence officials, and policy leaders said at the time.
Do you seriously think you know more about the wartime situation than the most important leaders who were there? You, the same person who didn't know what the Potsdam Declaration was and had never heard of the Interim Committee until I told you?
