Apple and Google Partner COVID-19 Contact Tracing Technology for iPhone & Android

StretfordRed

StretfordRed

Afro-European
Joined
Feb 9, 2014
Messages
11,156
Reputation
-2,060
Daps
32,532
Surprised there hasn't already been a thread on this:



Apple and Google today announced a joint effort that will see them using Bluetooth technology to help governments and health agencies reduce the spread of the COVID-19 virus around the world.

Apple says that user privacy and security will be central to the design of the project. Participation will be opt-in, and privacy, transparency, and consent are "of the utmost importance of this effort."Starting in May, Apple and Google will release APIs that enable interoperability between Android and iOS devices using apps from public health authorities. These apps will be available for users to download from the iOS App Store and Google Play.





In the coming months, Google and Apple will work to enable a broader Bluetooth-based contact tracing platform by building this functionality into their underlying platforms. Apple says that this solution is more robust than an API and will allow more individuals to participate, if they choose to opt in, and it will enable interaction with a broader ecosystem of apps and government health authorities.All information about the work being conducted by Apple and Google will be openly published and built in consultation with interested stakeholders. Initial details on the contact tracing technology are available on Apple's new webpage for the feature, which has links to technical documentation on Bluetooth specifications, cryptography specifications, and the framework API.


TechCrunch has specific details on how the tracking procedures will work. A random, rotating identifier will be assigned to a person's phone, and it will be transmitted via Bluetooth to other nearby devices.


The identifier, which rotates every 15 minutes and has no personally identifiable information, will pass through a relay server that can be run by health organizations worldwide. The list of identifiers a person has been in contact with doesn't leave the phone unless the user explicitly decides to share it. Users that test positive will not be identified to other users, Apple or Google.


All identification matching is done on device, allowing users to see within a 14-day window, whether their iPhone has been near the device of a person who has self-identified as having tested positive for COVID-19. Users who are notified that they have been exposed will then receive steps on what to do through a public health app.


Apple and Google are not using any location data for the tracking feature, including from the users who report being positive. The tool is meant to determine not where affected people have been, but rather if they've been around other people so that those people will know to self isolate due to the exposure.


Note: Due to the political or social nature of the discussion regarding this topic, the discussion thread is located in our Political News forum. All forum members and site visitors are welcome to read and follow the thread, but posting is limited to forum members with at least 100 posts.


Article Link: Apple and Google Partner on Opt-In COVID-19 Contact Tracing Technology to Be Added to iPhone and Android Smartphones

*************************************************************************************************************************



It's pretty interesting and I think it's a step that will help the US in their fight in Coronavirus. This is not something new in regards to battling this pandemic, as China and South Korea did similar things.

I'd had been a lot more skeptical if it was just Google, but considering Apple are in and are backing the privacy aspect of it, it is a lot more settling.

Security and privacy documents are here: Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing - Apple and Google

It all checks out - seems like this is going to be an interesting project in the future. We have something kinda similar in the UK where TfL (The MTA of London) track passengers anomalously via WiFi when we're in the underground system - that is not an opt-in or even out
 
Last edited:
goatmane

goatmane

Veteran
Joined
Jan 26, 2017
Messages
16,585
Reputation
2,417
Daps
112,965
See, this is why I wasn't mad about those stupid 5g conspiracy theories

Healthy scepticism is a good thing.

Also, they been tracking us lol
 
Warren Moon

Warren Moon

Superstar
Supporter
Joined
Jun 1, 2014
Messages
8,656
Reputation
760
Daps
25,584
This is how they stopped it in South Korea (democracy) and China.

it worked.

I knew this was coming :francis:
 
Mike809

Mike809

Veteran
Supporter
Joined
Oct 15, 2015
Messages
15,066
Reputation
3,506
Daps
77,011
Reppin
Bronx
alexander. said:
Good grief.

All this is going to do is make a lot of nikkas who might be sick think twice about getting tested.
Click to expand...
why would this make them think twice about being tested? is an opt-in app , you can choose to download it or not.
 
Dont@Me

Dont@Me

😡
Joined
Oct 21, 2014
Messages
10,362
Reputation
871
Daps
39,461
“We will not be infiltrating your privacy or tracking you” :mjlol: sure. Have y’all ever trusted Apple or google with such a statement? But let a virus get in the mix and everyone is happy to trust em.

and this sounds like BS to make people even more paranoid than necessary about this virus :francis:
 
loyola llothta

loyola llothta

☭☭☭
Joined
Apr 17, 2014
Messages
34,831
Reputation
6,961
Daps
79,657
Reppin
BaBylon
apple-fbi.jpg

20 April 2020
Apple and Google Announced a Coronavirus Tracking System. How Worried Should We be?

A well-designed tool could offer public health benefit, but a poorly designed one could pose unnecessary and significant risks to privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.


Apple and Google last week announced a joint contact tracing effort that would use Bluetooth technology to help alert people who have been in close proximity to someone who tested positive for COVID-19. Similar proposals have been put forward by an MIT-associated effort called PACT as well as by multiple European groups.


These proposals differ from the traditional public health technique of “contact tracing” to try to stop the spread of a disease. In place of human interviewers, they would use location or proximity data generated by mobile phones to contact people who may have been exposed.

While some of these systems could offer public health benefits, they may also cause significant risks to privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. If such systems are to work, there must be widespread, free, and quick testing available. The systems must also be widely adopted, but that will not happen if people do not trust them. For there to be trust, the tool must protect privacy, be voluntary, and store data on an individual’s device rather than in a centralized repository.

A well-designed tool would give people actionable medical information while also protecting privacy and giving users control, but a poorly designed one could pose unnecessary and significant risks to privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. To help distinguish between the two, the ACLU is publishing a set of technology principlesagainst which developers, the public, and policymakers can judge any contact tracing apps and protocols.

Technology principles that embed privacy by design are one important type of protection. There still need to be strict policies to mitigate against overreach and abuse. These policies, at a minimum, should include:

  • Voluntariness — Whenever possible, a person testing positive must consent to any data sharing by the app. The decision to use a tracking app should be voluntary and uncoerced. Installation, use, or reporting must not be a precondition for returning to work or school, for example.
  • Use Limitations — The data should not be used for purposes other than public health — not for advertising and especially not for any punitive or law enforcement purposes.
  • Minimization — Policies must be in place to ensure that only necessary information is collected and to prohibit any data sharing with anyone outside of the public health effort.
  • Data Destruction — Both the technology and related policies and procedures should ensure deletion of data when there is no longer a need to hold it.
  • Transparency — If the government obtains any data, it must be fully transparent about what data it is acquiring, from where, and how it is using that data.
  • No Mission Creep – Policies must be in place to ensure tracking does not outlive the effort against COVID-19.
These policies, at a minimum, must be in place to ensure that any tracking app will be effective and will accord with civil liberties and human rights.

The Apple/Google proposal, for instance, offers a strong start when measured against these technology principles.


Rather than track sensitive location histories, the Apple/Google protocol aims to use Bluetooth technology to record one phone’s proximity to another. Then, if a person tests positive, those logs can be used to notify people who were within Bluetooth range and refer them for testing, recommend self-isolation, or encourage treatment if any exists. Like the similar proposals, it relies on Bluetooth because the location data our cell phones generate is not accurate enoughfor contact tracing.

Like location histories, however, proximity records can be highly revealing because they expose who we spend time with. To their credit, the Apple/Google developers have considered that privacy problem. Rather than identify the people who own the phones, apps based on the protocol would use identifiers that cannot easily be traced back to phone owners.

As of this writing, the Apple/Google protocol could better address certain important privacy-related questions, however. For example, how does the tool define an epidemiologically relevant “contact”? The public needs to know if it is a good technological approximation of what public health professionals believe is a concern. Otherwise, the tool could be collecting far more personal information than is warranted by the crisis or could cause too many false alarms. And if there is indeed a plan to terminate the program at the conclusion of the pandemic, what criteria are the companies using to indicate when to press the built-in self-destruct button?

Another issue is whether phone users control when to submit their proximity logs for publication to the exposure database. These decisions should be made by the phone user. There may be good reasons why people do not want to upload all their data. User control can help to reduce false positives, for example if a user knows that identified contacts during that time were inaccurate (because they were in a car or wearing protective gear). It would also encourage people whose records include particularly sensitive contact information to at least volunteer the non-sensitive part of their records rather than fail to participate completely.

Also, when users share their proximity logs, what will they reveal? Right now, under the Apple/Google proposal, an infected user publicly shares a set of keys. Each key provides 24 hours of linkable data — a length of time that threatens the promised anonymity of the system. It is too easy to re-identify someone from 24 hours of data and the current proposal makes it impossible for the user to redact selected times during the day. There are other options that would ensure that identifiers published in the exposure database are as difficult as possible to connect to a person’s name or identity.

Voluntariness is particularly important. A critical mass of people will need to use a contact tracing app for it to be an effective public health mechanism, but some proposals to obtain that level of adoption have been coercive and scary. This is the wrong approach. When people feel that their phones are antagonistic rather than helpful, they will just turn location functions off or turn their phones off entirely. Others could simply leave their phone at home or acquire and register a second, dummy phone that is not their primary device with which they leave home. Good public health measures will leverage people’s own incentives to report disease, respond to warnings, and help stop the virus’s spread.

In the coming weeks and months, we are going to see a push to reopen the economy — an effort that will rely heavily on public health measures that include contact tracing. Bluetooth proximity tracking may be tried as a part of such efforts, though we don’t know how practical it will prove in real-world deployments. But privacy-by-design principles and the policy safeguards outlined here must be core to that effort if we are to benefit from a proximity tracking tool that can give people actionable medical information while also protecting privacy and giving users control.
Click to expand...

Link:

ACLU News & Commentary
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Top