the cac mamba
Veteran
you just compared the vietnam war, to the israel/palestine war. as comparable domestic issues for americansBrainless reply, think harder and try again.
might be the worst post of 2025, but you've still got a couple months left
you just compared the vietnam war, to the israel/palestine war. as comparable domestic issues for americansBrainless reply, think harder and try again.
his “fiancee” is paid off through to the primaryBooker is getting in the mix againtake a fukking hint, bro. it's never happening
In this list, the only thing he has done well is manage the aftermath of the wildfires. Everything else is maybes or could haves or just abouts.
Why do you think he will be the next president? What is convincing about him?
Especially in this moment when voters don't want more of the same from either party.
(Keep in mind, he has been groomed to be POTUS for nearly 20 years)
To add to what I said, there is a reason why we are going back and forth between the parties. Neither party has interest in the upheaval this nation wants. Obama had the chance in 2008, and he decided to bailout Wall Street and banks instead of people who needed it.
Trump had a neocon first term and then people are yelling they don't want a gestapo if it means a shyt economy.
Newsom isn't offering anything different.
Didn't get anything in Gaza and lost their ability to eat, get their ozempic, and whatever else is needed to live in your mom's basement at 40 as a guy blaming society for beingIon know why the Moral Narcissists wanna jump on Schumer, they the ones who voted for Cornel West or stayed at home on Election Day.
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with no hope or hoes.he'll definitely be fighting this machine, thoughNewsome is going to do well in the rust belt, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin because he's aware of the coastal elitism tag and has learned to leverage it.

he'll definitely be fighting this machine, though
honestly i'd say that's the least of his worries. being governor of california means he's pretty much King of the Liberals in the primaryHe gonna have a very hard road. Like I said before anti trump is easy right now, actually winning a nomination is going to be difficult. Especially when everyone else start attacking him for his failures


Attacking him for what?He gonna have a very hard road. Like I said before anti trump is easy right now, actually winning a nomination is going to be difficult. Especially when everyone else start attacking him for his failures
You're a stupid poster but not this stupid. Think harder and try again. Here, I'll help you.you just compared the vietnam war, to the israel/palestine war. as comparable domestic issues for americans
might be the worst post of 2025, but you've still got a couple months left
because american kids getting drafted was a domestic issue, you stupid fukk. israelis and palestinians fighting over jerusalem is notYou're a stupid poster but not this stupid. Think harder and try again. Here, I'll help you.
You claimed that foreign policy - as a categorical condition - is "much less important than domestic policy". I provided a counter with two foreign policy issues that legitimately superseded domestic issues in their respective elections
I don’t think the Dem nominee is a current national figure. Making statements now won’t make sense in a few years.Newsome is the most palatable selection of the existing Dem roster - It must be a frosty day in hell, that's twice today I've agreed with @the cac mamba - mainly for the reasons he listed.
Newsome is going to do well in the rust belt, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin because he's aware of the coastal elitism tag and has learned to leverage it. Watch the speech he just recently gave in Houston.
I agree about Pelosi, but Schumer and Obama were moderates and will stay that way.We have a lot of different variations of terms like moderate here on this site. I consider people like Schumer, Pelosi, etc. as Institutionalist, not moderates. Obama was a moderate in the beginning and now he's a full blown institutionalist as well. I feel like Biden did the opposite, started as an institutionalist early in his career and became a moderate towards the end after getting on the Obama ticket.
Greenberg, determined to understand why the white working class had abandoned the Democratic Party, studied the “Reagan Democrats” of Macomb County, Michigan, and came away convinced that they were winnable yet, if only Democrats returned to the economic populism of the New Deal, while moderating on social issues. In the absence of appeals to the middle class, Greenberg explained, Republicans filled the void with a “fusion of race and taxes,” turning blue-collar Macomb County voters against the concept of an active, expansive federal government. The study caught the attention of the Democratic Leadership Council, that bastion of New Democratic centrism. It was an unlikely marriage, but it proved fruitful for Greenberg, who was enlisted by Bill Clinton as a strategist. Clinton, a generationally talented politician, ran Greenberg’s populist playbook with ease, campaigning on tax cuts for the middle class and tax hikes for the wealthy, national health care, and increased education spending. The initial results were promising: Clinton won the presidency, and The New York Times, Shenk notes, poetically concluded that the Greenberg-led campaign represented “the first time since Robert Kennedy’s Indiana primary campaign in 1968, that it is politically possible to bring poor blacks and blue-collar white voters together.” For Greenberg, it was proof that his vision was not only viable but potentially transformative.
But once in the White House, Greenberg fought an uphill battle to translate class politics into class-based policy. As president, Clinton, facing pushback from congressional Republicans and Cabinet members like Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, sacrificed the populist offerings that Greenberg had made the keystone of the campaign: Middle-class tax cuts and national health care were out; welfare reform and Nafta were in. All the while, Clinton remained “happy to pay” the price of cultural moderation Greenberg associated with tacking left on economics, with such disastrous results as the 1994 crime bill and 1996’s Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, which won plaudits from the Chamber of Commerce. But with few economic wins for the middle class, Clinton’s rhetoric on welfare and crime appeared less as lamentable trade-offs for resurrecting working-class politics and more as proof of concept for Schoen’s theory that America had moved irreversibly to the right. When the administration’s approval rating plummeted and Republicans trounced Democrats in the 1994 midterms shortly after, it had become clear that there was a void at the heart of Clintonian politics as conceived by Greenberg.
Into it stepped Schoen and Penn, whom Clinton hired as pollsters. Greenberg was unceremoniously eased out of Clinton’s inner circle to make room for the computer-savvy Schoen and Penn; his weekly meetings with Clinton, Shenk notes, were dropped from the president’s schedule. With the president’s ear, Schoen and Penn advised the president to craft policy that would appeal to “soccer moms,” moderate voters who bristled at the GOP’s puritanical social policies, and Ross Perot voters, an ideologically jumbled mass of disaffected (mostly conservative) political free agents. Electorally, it was a reasonable strategy; Clinton had limped to victory in 1992, winning only a plurality of voters against unpopular incumbent George H.W. Bush and benefiting greatly from Perot’s nearly 19 percent vote share. Ideologically, it meant acquiescing to Schoen’s fatalistic view of the electorate, irretrievably trending right, forcing Democrats to demonstrate consensus on economic issues with Republicans and “pivot to local issues and personality differences.” If you pointed out that David Duke’s 1988 presidential campaign “was managed by a former commander in the American Nazi Party,” many white voters would “shrug it off,” Schoen and Penn told Louisiana Democratic Governor Edwin Edwards, facing a challenge by Duke and his barely rebranded right-populism. “Say that he was a tax cheat who lied about serving in the military, and they might start to pay attention.”
With Schoen and Penn calling the shots, Clinton won reelection in 1996 but couldn’t stop the downballot bleeding that began under Greenberg; Republicans won back the House and Senate. White-knuckled victories that nonetheless exposed cracks and failed in their bids to reverse dealignment would become a common outcome under Greenberg and Schoen. (In the United Kingdom, where both men took turns consulting for the Labour Party from 1994 under Tony Blair’s leadership and on into the twenty-first century, they oversaw what Shenk describes as the gradual loss of Labour strongholds, culminating in a string of Tory premierships.)
“The change we must make isn’t liberal or conservative. It’s both, and it’s different,” Clinton said in a speech, written by Greenberg, launching his campaign in 1992. Usually, a statement like this indicates a move to the right. In Clinton’s case, the line would prove to be a near-poetic encapsulation of the Third Way as both an incoherent ideology and a stalking horse, intentional or otherwise, for conservatism. By 2000, Clinton had absorbed the social moderation of Greenberg and the fiscal conservatism of Schoen, jettisoning the economic populism that held Greenberg’s hoped-for new Democratic majority together, and creating the blueprint for a global Third Way. The result was a liberal politics pugilistic enough to win power but emptied out of a transformative vision for the future. There would be no emergent majority, no New Deal Coalition redux or New Labour revival. Instead, there would be triangulation, half-loaves, and forestalled defeat: Labour’s democratic socialism would give way to “social-ism” and Blair’s toothless “One Britain” slogan. Clinton’s heir, Al Gore, under Greenberg’s guidance, would hemorrhage white working-class men and the non-college-educated in 2000, narrowly losing to George W. Bush.
….
Drunk on adults-in-the-room realism, Schoen and Penn failed to recognize that politics creates new consensus as much as it responds to existing ones. There are rules to the game, constraints on electorates, but those rules can always be rewritten by savvy politicians and, yes, forward-thinking strategists. By heralding a new anti–New Deal consensus, Schoen and Penn imagined a politics that could manage the decline of class politics but never reverse it. A Labour member of Parliament neatly summed up this approach after Keir Starmer’s decisive victory in the 2024 U.K. general election: “The question is ‘what’s the point of a Labour government?’” The MP, and Shenk, might as well be asking about Schoen’s entire brand of politics, in all of its global forms.
Jog my memory, were American kids getting drafted in 2004?because american kids getting drafted was a domestic issue, you stupid fukk. israelis and palestinians fighting over jerusalem is not
Latvia is not sending its best
