For us to spin up manufacturing at a scale and a affordability that makes sense to service the globe will take 3-5 years to set up at the fastest and will require a depression of wages here worse than what it is right now.
America is a tech and financial center for the world. Mass blue collar manufacturing doesnt work very well here for exports because of the exchange rate. Its part of the reason China manipulates its currency. It makes more business sense to continue to manufacture in Bangladesh, China, Vietnam, etc.
The US recovers "quickly" (from a stock market standpoint not street standpoint) because of bailouts from american citizens, not from any special intellectual or systemic capability. Our system actually encourages recklessness and economic gambling because they expect to run to the government with their hand out when they fuk up. Thats not very free market or capitalistic. US tech companies are incestuous with their AI spending because they are expecting a bail out when the bubble pops.
These arent short term missteps. The Tariffs have permanently altered China's relationship with U.S. Farmers. The US willingness to walk away from international government agreements at an unprecedented level isn't going to be seen as a small hiccup. The administration lack of desire to regulate AI privacy and security parameters is showing the world that the US govt isnt leading in the tech space. There is a marked reduction from foreign powers and even some allies that America is a competent leader in the world.
The reason US foreign policy likes partnering with dictators is because its stable, and often predictable. Thats what every government in the world wants to build a relationship from, stability and predictability. That and the damage from American colonialism are what makes China appealing to smaller strategically valuable nations.
Spinning up global scale manufacturing in the US is not intended to replicate China’s low wage export model, nor does it require broad wage depression to succeed. Modern manufacturing growth in the US is centered on automation, capital intensity, energy advantage, and proximity to high value markets. The objective is resilience and strategic capacity, not servicing the entire globe with cheap labor based exports.
US being a tech and financial hub does not preclude industrial relevance. Advanced economies historically combine finance, technology, and selective manufacturing dominance. Exchange rates disadvantage low margin exports… but they favor high value, precision, and IP embedded production. This is why reshoring efforts focus on semiconductors, energy systems, aerospace, defense, and advanced materials rather than garments or basic assembly.
Currency manipulation explains China’s export success only partially. China’s manufacturing advantage came from decades of state directed infrastructure, labor control, and forced technology transfer, not just exchange rates. Replicating that model in Bangladesh or Vietnam does not replace China’s integrated scale, nor does it eliminate strategic vulnerabilities that reliance on those regions still creates.
US economic recoveries are not simply the result of bailouts masking systemic weakness. They occur because the American system reallocates capital, labor, and technology faster than more rigid economies. Bailouts socialize losses in crises, but they also prevent systemic collapse and preserve productive capacity. This is a stability mechanism, not evidence of intellectual or institutional deficiency.
Moral hazard exists, but it is not unique to the US… nor does it negate structural strength. China’s system suppresses failure through state support as well, but does so continuously rather than episodically, which compounds inefficiency and debt. The difference is visibility, not recklessness.
AI investment concentration in US tech firms does not imply guaranteed bailouts. Most AI capital is private, globally contested, and performance driven. A correction would destroy weaker firms and reallocate talent rather than collapse the system. The expectation of government rescue is far less reliable in tech than in banking or defense.
Tariffs did alter China’s relationship with US farmers, but they also forced diversification that reduced long term exposure to Chinese retaliation. Trade friction accelerated new markets, alternative buyers, and subsidy backed stability rather than permanent dependency loss. Strategic trade offs were accepted knowingly… not accidentally.
Treaty withdrawals and regulatory gaps damage perception, but they do not erase power. Many countries distinguish between US political volatility and US capacity to deliver security, capital, and tech. Reliability in enforcement and capability often outweighs rhetorical consistency in international alignments.
A slower approach to AI regulation does not signal leadership failure… it reflects a calculated tolerance for experimentation and scale building before constraint. The US historically leads by allowing innovation first and regulating after dominance is established. Early regulation tends to lock in second mover disadvantage rather than trust.
Partnering with authoritarian governments is not uniquely American behavior, nor is it primarily about preference for dictators. It reflects realist alignment around energy access, logistics, and security guarantees. China follows the same logic while branding it differently. Stability is valued everywhere, but stability without transparency and legal recourse carries hidden risks that many states learn only over time.
China’s appeal to smaller states is real… but conditional. It weakens when debt stress, political leverage, and limited local spillovers become visible. The US model is slower, messier, and more public… but it offers long term integration into capital markets, tech ecosystems, and security structures that China cannot replicate at scale.
