Gregg v. Georgia,
Proffitt v. Florida,
Jurek v. Texas,
Woodson v. North Carolina, and
Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 153 (1976), reaffirmed the United States Supreme Court's acceptance of the use of the
death penalty in the United States, upholding, in particular, the death sentence imposed on
Troy Leon Gregg. Referred to by a leading scholar as the
July 2 Cases[1] and elsewhere referred to by the lead case
Gregg, the Supreme Court set forth the two main features that capital sentencing procedures must employ in order to
comport (i.e. comply) with the
Eighth Amendment ban on "cruel and unusual punishments." The decision essentially ended the
de facto moratorium on the death penalty imposed by the Court in its 1972 decision in
Furman v. Georgia 408
U.S. 238 (1972).
Background
All five cases share the same basic procedural history. After the
Furman decision, the states of Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and Louisiana amended their death penalty statutes to meet the
Furman guidelines. Subsequently, the five named defendants
[2] were convicted of murder and sentenced to death in their respective states. The respective state supreme court
[3] upheld the death sentence. The defendants then
asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review their death sentence, asking the Court to go beyond
Furman and declare once and for all the death penalty to be "cruel and unusual punishment" and thus in violation of the Constitution; the Court agreed to hear the cases.
In the
July 2 Cases, the Court's goal was to provide guidance to states in the wake of
Furman. In
Furman only one basic idea could command a majority vote of the Justices: capital punishment, as then practiced in the United States, was cruel and unusual punishment because there were no rational standards that determined when it was imposed and when it was not. The question the Court resolved in these cases was not whether the death sentence imposed on each of the individual defendants was cruel, but rather whether the process by which those sentences were imposed was rational and objectively reviewable.
Capital punishment and the Eighth Amendment
The defendants in each of the five cases urged the Court to go farther than it had in
Furman by holding once and for all that capital punishment was cruel and unusual punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment. However the Court responded that "The most marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to
Furman." Both Congress and 35 states had complied with the Court's dictates in
Furman by either specifying factors to be weighed and procedures to be followed when imposing a death sentence, or dictating that the death penalty would be mandatory for specific crimes. Furthermore, a
referendum in California had overturned the California Supreme Court's earlier decision (
California v. Anderson) holding that the death penalty violated the
California constitution. The fact that juries remained willing to impose the death penalty also contributed to the Court's conclusion that American society did not believe in 1976 that the death penalty was in all circumstances a cruel and unusual punishment.
The Court also found that the death penalty "comports with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the [Eighth] Amendment". The death penalty serves two principal social purposes—retribution and deterrence. "In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct". But this outrage must be expressed in an ordered fashion, for America is a society of laws. Retribution is consistent with human dignity, because society believes that "certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death". And although it is difficult to determine statistically how much crime the death penalty actually deters, the Court found that in 1976 there was "no convincing empirical evidence" supporting either the view that the death penalty is an effective deterrent to crime or the opposite view. Still, the Court could not completely discount the possibility that for certain "carefully contemplated murderers", "the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act".
Finally, the Court considered whether the death penalty is "disproportionate in relation to the crime for which it is imposed". Although death is severe and irrevocable, the Court could not say that death was always disproportionate to the crime of deliberately taking human life. "It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes".