bruh its almost 2020 and yall listening to podcasts on 1x speed?I was trying to listen to that this morning but its' a damn hour and a half

bruh its almost 2020 and yall listening to podcasts on 1x speed?![]()

You right.bruh its almost 2020 and yall listening to podcasts on 1x speed?![]()
The podcast showcased why I dislike the term neoliberalism. The term is vague. Does it mean a belief in centrist politics? a belief in a mixed economy? a belief in neo-classical economics? How is it different from neo-conservatism?
I usually like Noah, but if the conversation was going to revolve around Economic history Ezra should have invited someone else. Econ history is not Noah's strong suit, he consistently states that he doesn't read a lot of older economics.
Neoliberals were supposed "liberals" who latched onto market worship and began pushing privatization and deregulation for their wealthy supporters.
I like this article in modeling why I talk shyt about neoliberals so much.
Even if one takes this to be the main interpretation of the term, it is often attached to individuals who do not believe in market worship or privatization and deregulation for the benefit of the wealthy. Individuals on the left like Obama, Clinton, Warren, and Paul Krugman have been deemed neoliberals.
The author defines neoliberalism as a belief that:
These elements are not consistently present among Reagan, Thatcher, Friedman, Hayek, Obama, Clinton, Trump and yet neoliberalism is attached to all of them.
- Market's are self-sufficient.
- Market's do not need regulation.
- Everything that promotes the market needs to be encouraged.
- Everything is to be made over in the image of the market.

When Clinton and Gore made their bid for the White House in 1992, these themes were central to their campaign. Clinton repeatedly promised “a new approach to government” that “offers more empowerment and less entitlement … that expands opportunity, not bureaucracy.” The DLC and PPI continued to exert an influence as Clinton made the transition to Washington. In fact, From and DLC staffer Bruce Reed headed the domestic policy transition team. In a homage to Reagan, From and Reed penned a report called “The Clinton Revolution” with a clear plan for the new president’s first 100 days.
Just after the election, PPI also published “Mandate for Change,” as a more public-facing guidebook for the incoming administration. Fusing the arguments of “Reinventing Government” with the DLC’s other principles, “Mandate for Change” called for “introducing choice, competition and market incentives into the public sector” and the need to “emphasize economic growth generated in free markets as the prerequisite for opportunity for all.” The book outlined programs and initiatives for shoring up economic growth through the high-tech sector and for advancing free trade, as well as programs for addressing poverty and other social issues.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PPI actively promoted ideas like enterprise zones, microenterprise in both the United States and the developing world, welfare-to-work, charter schools, and cap and trade. These proposals came to directly influence many of the policies the Clinton administration advocated and implemented during its tenure.
Although questionable if it fully “reinvented government,” the Democratic version of neoliberalism forged in the 1970s that came to fruition in the Clinton era has had an enduring influence. It lasted well beyond when Bill Clinton left office and the DLC officially closed up shop in 2011. The mainstream Democratic Party — as demonstrated by the Obama administration and its allies — remained committed to growth and investment over redistribution and celebrated market-orientated solutions, public-private partnership, especially with the tech industry, and nonprofits and foundations as the main mechanism for addressing problems of inequality. In promoting the market and private sector as a means to “do good” and solve problems of poverty, the Democrats helped make market ever more embedded in government policy and American life.
Two critical tenets of neoliberalism are its theory of income distribution and its theory of aggregate employment determination. With regard to income distribution, neoliberalism asserts that factors of production—labor and capital—get paid what they are worth. This is accomplished through the supply and demand process, whereby payment depends on a factor’s relative scarcity (supply) and its productivity (which affects demand). With regard to aggregate employment determination, neoliberalism asserts that free markets will not let valuable factors of production—including labor—go to waste. Instead, prices will adjust to ensure that demand is forthcoming and that all factors are employed. This assertion is at the foundation of Chicago School monetarism, which claims that economies automatically self-adjust to full employment and that the use of monetary and fiscal policy to permanently raise employment merely generates inflation.
These two theories have been extraordinarily influential, and they contrast with the thinking that held sway in the period between 1945 and 1980. During this earlier era, the dominant theory of employment determination was Keynesianism, which maintains that the level of economic activity is determined by the level of aggregate demand. Additionally, Keynesians maintain that capitalist economies are subject to periodic weakness in the aggregate demand generation process, resulting in unemployment. Occasionally, this weakness can be severe and produce economic depressions—as exemplified by the Great Depression. In such a world, monetary and fiscal policy can stabilize the demand generation process.
Whereas Keynesians have always agreed on a common theory of employment determination, they have always been divided regarding the theory of income distribution. This division created a fatal breach that facilitated the triumph of neoliberalism. American Keynesians (known as neo-Keynesians) tend to accept the neoliberal “paid what you are worth” theory of income distribution, while European Keynesians (widely associated with Cambridge, U.K., and known as post-Keynesians) reject it. Instead, post-Keynesians argue that income distribution depends significantly on institutional factors. Thus, not only do a factor’s relative scarcity and productivity matter, but so too does its bargaining power, which is impacted by institutional arrangements. This explains the significance of trade unions, laws governing minimum wages, employee rights at work, and systems of social protection such as unemployment insurance. Finally, public understandings of the economy also matter, since a public that views the economy through a bargaining power lens will have greater political sympathies for trade unions and institutions of social protection.
Obama wasn't neoliberal as fukk. He relied heavily on keynesian principles. Economic bailouts and supply side market solutions aren't really neoliberal because they involve an increased role of government and government solutions.
A true neoliberal would have allowed the markets to fail.
I’m not alone in marveling at the extent to which Obama has thrown his rhetorical weight behind anti-Keynesian economics; Ryan Avent is equally amazed, as are many others. And now he’s endorsing the structural unemployment story too.
The derailment of progressive Keynesianism by Obama’s conservative, technocratic Keynesianism resulted in a protracted recovery, continuing high unemployment, millions of foreclosed or bankrupt households fending for themselves, and more scandals in a Wall Street where nothing had changed. Obama did not pay for this tragic outcome in 2012, but Hillary Clinton did in 2016...
Keynesianism’s impact on policy-making has been limited and, in the case of financial reform, minimal. The aim of this paper is to shed light on this paradox.